Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 19

Issue 4

Article 4

5-15-1992

Big Business Beware: Punitive Damages Do Not Violate
Fourteenth Amendment According to Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip
Christopher V. Carlyle

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Consumer Protection Law Commons, Fourteenth
Amendment Commons, Law and Economics Commons, Law and Society Commons, Legal Remedies
Commons, Litigation Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Christopher V. Carlyle Big Business Beware: Punitive Damages Do Not Violate Fourteenth Amendment
According to Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 19 Pepp. L. Rev. Iss. 4 (1992)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol19/iss4/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

Big Business Beware: Punitive Damages Do Not
Violate the Fourteenth Amendment According to
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip

I.

INTRODUCTION

Punitive damages have been called "a salutary method of discouraging evil motives,"' a "monstrous heresy," 2 and everything in between. Juries award punitive damages in certain cases when the
actions of a defendant have been particularly egregious. 3 They are
not intended to compensate the victim, but rather to punish and deter the defendant.4 America's system of awarding punitive damages
is referred to as the common law system, so called because little has
5
changed since the first settlers brought it with them from England.
The system remains quite simple. The jury is instructed to consider
the seriousness of the defendant's wrongful actions and the need to
deter similar conduct in the future.6 If the jury chooses to award punitive damages, then the trial court reviews the award, and the appellate court does likewise. 7 Although a seemingly basic system,
punitive damages have never been without controversy.
In the last twenty years, the debate concerning punitive damages
has intensified. Punitive damages became a hot topic in both legal
circles and the general population as enormous awards began to appear in the 1970s.8 The burgeoning areas of mass tort litigation and
bad faith insurance claims, combined with the expanding notion of
vicarious liability, resulted in punitive awards that were often staggering in size.9 A Texas jury awarded a three-billion dollar punitive
award in the mid-1980s, but an appellate court reduced the amountI. W.

PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 12

(5th ed. 1984).
2. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873).
3. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 2 at 9-11.
4. See infra notes 46-64 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
6. See Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1042 (1991).
7. Id.
8. See Melvin M. Belli, Sr., Punitive Damages: Their History, Their Use and
Their Worth in Present-Day Society, 49 UMKC L. REV. 1, 1 n.1 (1980).
9. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
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to one billion.1O Tort reform groups arose, and individuals ranging
from legal scholars" to most recently the Vice President 12 have
called for a change. Many felt that this change would come from the
United States Supreme Court,' 3 as three of the Court's decisions in
the 1980s hinted that the Court might look favorably upon a due process challenge to the common law system.14 The Court resolved the
issue in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip.15
Pacific Mutual has been called the most important case of the
United States Supreme Court's 1990-91 term'6 and also the most important business case of the decade. 17 In Pacific Mutual, the Court
examined a due process challenge to an award of punitive damages
and held that the common law system did not violate due process.'S
The punitive award in the case was $840,000, more than two hundred
times greater than the plaintiff's out-of-pocket expense.' 9 This decision surprised many, especially the eighty business groups that filed
twenty-four amicus briefs in hopes that the Court would decide to reform the system. However, their pleas did not persuade the Court.20
This Note discusses the Pacific Mutual decision and its impact on
law and business. Section II briefly examines the history of punitive
damages, paying special attention to the issues involved in Pacific
Mutual.21 Among those issues are vicarious liability and insurance
bad faith actions. 22 Sections III and IV discuss the background of the
decision and analyze the decision itself.23 Section V examines Pacific
10. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 866 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). For
further discussion of the case, see infra notes 153-8 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Coles, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic
That Has Outlived Its Origins,37 VAND. L. REv. 1117 (1984).
12. Vice President Dan Quayle, Address at the American Bar Association Conference (Aug. 13, 1991) (calling on the ABA to help reform the punitive damage system in
America).
13. See Steven H. Sneiderman, The Futureof Punitive DamagesAfter BrowningFerrisIndustries v. Kelco Disposal, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1031, 1046 (1990) (concluding that
in light of recent decisions, "it is this Author's opinion that the Court will be receptive
to a due process argument regarding excessive punitive damage awards").
14. See ifura notes 162-92 and accompanying text.
15. 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
16. Denise Kalette, ConsumersHail High Court Ruling, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 1991,
at 7B (quoting Stephen Bokat, General Counsel for the United States Chamber of
Commerce).
17. Tony Mauro, Damaging the Anti-Punitive Crusade, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 8, 1990,
at 10. The case has also been referred to as "[t]he most important case in aviation law,
in decades." Lee S. Kreindler, Clearance for Punitive Damages, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 29,
1991, at 3.
18. PacificMutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1043.
19. Id, at 1037, 1046.
20. See Andrea Sachs, A Blow to Big Business: The Supreme Court Upholds a $1
Million Jury Verdict, TIME, Mar. 18, 1991, at 71.
21. See infra notes 26-193 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 194-372 and accompanying text.
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Mutual's impact on business, future due process challenges, and the
25
states.24 Section VI provides a brief conclusion.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A.

History of Punitive Damages
1.

English History

The roots of our punitive damages system extend through history,
arguably reaching back to ancient times.26 The genesis of the common law tradition of punitive damages dates back to the thirteenth
century, when juries began to award damages in excess of the actual
loss.2 7 However, the awarding of actual punitive or exemplary damages dates back to 1763 and the cases of Wilkes v. Wood 28 and
Huckle v. Mahoney.2 9 In both of these cases, English appellate courts
upheld trial court awards that punished the guilty party for outra30
geous conduct that had harmed the honor of the plaintiff.
In the years following Wilkes and Huckle, punitive damages became an accepted part of the English legal system, though confusion
as to their purpose and application arose.3 ' Some courts felt that
they were a separate and truly punitive award, while others believed
that they were merely an extra allowance of compensatory damages
permitted in cases of outrageous conduct.3 2 In 1964, the court in
Rookes v. Barnard33 finally put the confusion to rest by severely limiting the instances where a party can seek punitive damages. 34 In the
United Kingdom, punitive damages may only be awarded: (1) to punish a government official's egregious conduct; (2) when private entities engage in conduct designed to make an extreme profit for the
24. See infra notes 373-434 and accompanying text.
25. See infra note 435 and accompanying text.
26. See LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 1.2 (2d
ed. 1989).
27. See Belli, supra note 8, at 3; Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70
HARV. L. REV. 517, 518 n.13 (1957).
28. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763) (involving trespass).
29. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763) (involving imprisonment).
30. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 26, at 6-8; Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1990) [hereinafter
Daniels & Martin study].
31. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 26, at 12-13.
32. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 78 (1935).
33. 1 All E.R. 367 (1964).
34. For a detailed explanation of the Rookes decision and the current English doctrine, see SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 26, at 12-13.
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actor; or (3) when a statute authorizes a punitive damages award.3 5
As a result, punitive damages have virtually disappeared in
England.3 6
2. American History
Punitive damages have always been part of the American justice
system. The 1791 case of Coryell v. Colbaugh37 awarded damages for
the sake of example when a defendant breached a promise to
marry.3 8 In 1851, the United States Supreme Court first upheld the
common law method for assessing punitive damages in Day v. Woodworth.3 9 The Court subsequently recognized punitive damages in
other decisions of the period.40 However, the method has always
been controversial.
From the mid-nineteenth century, commentators Simon Greenleaf
1
and Theodore Sedgwick debated the nature of punitive damages.4
Greenleaf argued that punitive damages were actually a form of compensation, 42 while Sedgwick maintained that in cases of "gross fraud,
wantonness, malice, or oppression" courts could impose punitive
damages to punish the defendant.43 Some courts of the era refused
to acknowledge the existence of punitive damages. 44
a. Primary rationalesfor punitive damages
The argument regarding the value and propriety of punitive damages continued into the twentieth century, and scholars have debated
35. Id. at 14. See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 2, at 9 & n.20.
36. See Belli, supra note 8, at 4.
37. 1 N.J.L. 90 (1791).
38. Id The court urged the jury not to look at the actual loss, but to award damages for "example's sake." Id, at 91.
39. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
40. See Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897) (holding that the practice of awarding
punitive damages is well settled); Lake Shore Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893)
(holding that punitive damages are not awarded for compensation, but for punishment
and as a warning); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 524 (1885) (stating
that "the wisdom of allowing such additional damages ... is attested by the long continuance of the practice").
41. For an explanation of the debate, see Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111
S. Ct. 1032, 1047 (1991) (Scalia, J. concurring).
42. SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 253, at 235 (13th

ed. 1899). This idea continues today, as three states (Connecticut, Michigan and Georgia) consider punitives as an element of compensation. See Sneiderman, supra note 13,
at 1036.
43. THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 347, at 687
(9th ed. 1912).
44. In a famous and often quoted passage, former Justice Foster of the New
Hampshire Supreme Court assessed punitive damages, stating, "The idea is wrong. It
is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and unhealthy excrescence, deforming the
symmetry of the body of the law." Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1873).
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the various rationales for the practice. 45 Of the rationales, the two
most often cited and discussed are punishment and deterrence. 46
i.

Punishment

Proponents of punitive damages argue that punishment is a valid
purpose for a civil penalty because the criminal justice system does
not handle all outrageous conduct. 47 As such, punitive damages serve
as gap fillers to address conduct deserving of punishment that happens to fall beyond the realm of criminal law.48 Proponents note
that some courts are adopting the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence as opposed to the traditional civil standard of preponderance of the evidence; thus, as a quasi-criminal punishment is
meted out, it is done according to a quasi-criminal standard.49 Some
50
legislatures have followed suit.
Critics of the punishment rationale argue that punitive damages
are a function of civil laws, and that the nature of civil law involves
45. See Dorsey D. Ellis Jr., Fairness and Ffficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Ellis, 1982]. Professor Ellis sets out seven
objectives for punitive damages that have emerged through the years: (1) punishment;
(2) specific deterrence (to prevent the offending party from repeating his actions);
(3) general deterrence (to prevent others from acting similarly); (4) preservation of the
peace; (5) as an inducement for private law enforcement; (6) compensation where compensation is not available through other means; and (7) payment of the plaintiff's attorney fees. Id at. 3-12.
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs, § 908 (1979) ("Punitive damages are
damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a person for
his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in
the future."); Belli, supra note 8, at 6-7. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence
and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages:A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L.
REV. 133 (1982) (examining the punishment and deterrence rationales in light of existing law).
47. Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 644-47 (1980); Samuel Friefield, The Rationale of Punitive Damages, 1 OHIO ST. L.J. 5, 6-9 (1935). See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 2,

at 12 (stating that punitive damages act "as an incentive to bring into court and redress
a long array of petty cases of outrage and oppression which in practice escape the notice of prosecuting attorneys occupied with serious crime").
48. JAMES D. GHIARDI & JOHN L. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRAC-

TICE § 2.02 (4th ed. 1990).
49. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Roginsky v. Richardson-Merell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967); Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723
P.2d 675 (Ariz. 1986). For a detailed analysis of the preponderance/clear and convincing debate concerning punitive damages, see Jewell Hargleroad, Comment, Punitive
Damages: The Burden of ProofRequired by ProceduralDue Process, 22 U.S.F. L. REV.
99 (1987) (arguing that the clear and convincing standard is more appropriate).
50. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b)
(Michie 1988); IND. CODE § 34-4-34-2 (1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925(1) (1988).
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compensation, not punishment. 5 1 The punishment rationale is often
criticized as handing out essentially a criminal punishment while not
offer the protections of the criminal justice system. 52 It is further argued that if punishment is the goal, a criminal burden of proof
53
should have to be met, not a civil one.
ii.

Deterrence

Proponents argue that the deterrent effect of punitive damages operates effectively on both an individual and a general level. 54 An individual forced by the court to pay a large punitive award will be
hesitant to repeat his wrongful act for fear of a court levying another
such award against him. 55 This generally deters others from engaging in similar acts for fear of similar reprisal.56 Also, it has been
stated that deterrence is achieved because an award of punitive damages "stigmatizes" the individual defendant in a far greater way than
a compensatory award does, almost reaching the level of a criminal
verdict.5 7 Others will refrain from similar conduct for fear of having
58
the stigma of a punitive award attached to them.
Critics of the deterrence rationale charge that no proof exists that
conduct is, in fact, deterred.59 Others postulate that punitive damages are ineffective in deterring corporate misconduct in the modern
world.6 0 Additionally, some maintain that the deterrence rationale

fails because it works too well; it deters entities from acting in posi51. See GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 48, at § 2.02.

52. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Process,and the Jury, 40 ALA. L.
REV. 975, 991-99 (1989) [hereinafter Ellis, 1989].
53. See, e.g., Susan M. Peters, Punitive Damages in Oregon, 18 WILLAMErE L.
REV. 369, 407 (1982). See also Andrew M. Kenefick, Note, The Constitutionalityof Punitive Damages Under the Ecessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 85 MICH.
L. REV. 1699 (1987) (arguing that punitive damages are as punitive as criminal penalties, and thus, Eighth Amendment protections should apply).
54. See GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 48, at § 2.06.
55. Id. at § 2.07.
56. Id. at § 2.09.
57. See John Dwight Ingram, Punitive Damages Should Be Abolished, 17 CAP. U.
L. REV. 205, 218 (1987). There does, however, seem to be some inconsistency in Ingram's article. Ingram states that when a jury finds malicious action on the part of the
defendant, a punitive damage "judgment based on such a finding carries with it a
stigma nearly as damaging as a criminal conviction." Id. However, Ingram also writes
that "[c]riminal punishment carries with it much stronger social disapprobation, and
much more lasting consequences." Id. at 213.
58. Id. at 218.
59. See Peters, supra note 53, at 420-23.
60. See E. Donald Elliot, Why Punitive Damages Don't Deter Corporate Misconduct Fffectively, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1053 (1989) (stating that punitive damages are ineffective and ought to be abolished in corporate litigation because their imposition is too
slow and uncertain, and their magnitude is minimal). But see Michael Wells, Comments On Why Punitive Damages Don't Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively, 40
ALA. L. REV. 1073 (1989) (arguing for modification, not abandonment, of the punitive
damage system).
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tive ways because they cannot accommodate the financial risk. 61 Further, some have argued that if deterrence is the goal, there is no
justification for plaintiffs reaping a punitive damage jackpot. 62 In
fact, some have proposed that the government should benefit from
punitive awards,63 and some states have enacted legislation to bring
this about. 64
b.

Punitive damages and mass tort litigation

The debate continued along these academic lines for years, and
though always a point of contention, punitive damages were a relatively benign issue until the concept of mass tort litigation arose in
the late 1960s. 65 Prior to that time, a typical case involving punitive
damages had only two parties and involved some isolated incident between them.6 6 The singular nature of the cases and the relation of
67
the parties aided juries in assessing unspectacular awards.
In 1967, the Second Circuit decided Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell.68 In Roginsky, the plaintiff brought a products liability action
against a drug, manufacturer, claiming that the company knew about
possible harmful effects of one of their drugs. 69 The plaintiff as61. See Ingram, supra note 57, at 214 (stating that "[d]esired products may never
come to market, new ideas may be stifled, and needed advocacy may be suppressed").
62. Commentators have made this argument for many years, and still make it today. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Punitive damages are generally seen as a windfall to plaintiffs, who are entitled to receive
full compensation for their injuries-but no more."); Bass v. Chicago & Northwestern
Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 654, 672 (1877) (arguing that "it is... difficult to understand why, if
the tortfeasor is to be punished by exemplary damages, they should go to the compensated sufferer.") See also Sales & Coles, supra note 11, at 1165 (stating that "punitive
damages simply provide a windfall to the plaintiff"); Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1173, 1206 (1931) (stating that the flaw of the punitive damage system is that it encourages plaintiffs to bring frivolous suits purely out
of self-interest, hoping to win a large punitive judgment).
63. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARv. L. REV. 517, 523
(1957).
64. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 768.73(2) (1988); IOWA CODE § 668A.1 (1987); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 537.675 (Vernon 1988).
65. See John Calvin Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive
Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 141 (1986).
66. I&
67. Ld, "[Miost punitive damage judgments were, by today's standards, almost trivial in amount." Id.
68. 378 F.2d 832 (2nd Cir. 1967).
69. For more information concerning the Roginsky litigation and other suits
brought concerning the drug involved in Roginky, MER/29, see Paul D. Rheingold,
The MER/29 Story: An Instance of Successful Mass DisasterLitigation,56 CAL. L. REV.
116 (1968).
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serted that he suffered personal injury, primarily cataracts, after taking the defendant's drug that was intended to lower blood cholesterol
levels. 70 The company altered test results that it submitted to the
Food and Drug Administration and marketed the product anyway,
despite knowledge of the hazards. 71 Although the court held that
there was insufficient evidence to allow punitive damages in Roginsky, the case exposed the problems that can arise when a large
number of plaintiffs seek punitive damages against a single defendant.7 2 Each plaintiff could obtain an enormous punitive judgment
against the company. 73 The company would then be vulnerable to a
staggering amount of liability, risking bankruptcy and the investments of stockholders. 74 The dangers Roginsky exposed, however,
did not immediately come to pass. In 1976, a leading commentator
wrote that the anticipated flood of large punitive damage awards had
not occurred, and that only three appellate courts had upheld punitive damage awards in product liability cases. 75 This calm did not
last.
Plaintiffs filed an abundance of product liability actions that included claims for punitive damages from the late 1970s through the
1980s. 76 These cases involved manufacturers of products that were
widely used by the public. 77 The defendants in these lawsuits in70. Roginsky, 378 F.2d at 834.
71. Id.
72. Judge Friendly warned:
The legal difficulties engendered by claims for punitive damages on the part
of hundreds of plaintiffs are staggering. If all recovered punitive damages in
the amount here awarded these would run into the tens of millions, as contrasted with the maximum criminal penalty ....
We have the gravest difficulty in perceiving how claims for punitive damages in such a multiplicity of
actions throughout the nation can be so administered as to avoid overkill.
Id. at 839.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 841.
75. David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH.
L. REV. 1258, 1261 & n.12 (1976).
76. Jeffries, supra note 65, at 142.
77. Id. For more information concerning these types of lawsuits and the problems
encountered with them, see generally Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions and Duplicative Legislation, 62 IND. L.J. 507 (1986) (postulating that federal class actions may
avoid the problem of duplicative litigation); Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in ProductsLiability Litigation, 74 KY. L.J. 1
(1985) (providing an overview of products liability cases involving punitive damages
and suggesting reforms to bring punitives closer to their purposes); Timothy J. Phillips, Note, The Punitive Damage Class Action: A Solution to the Problem of Multiple
Punishment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 153 (arguing that punitive damage class actions can
avoid many problems associated with mass punitive litigation); Richard A. Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 37 (1983) (discussing the inherent problems of mass tort litigation
and suggesting possible solutions).
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78
automobiles, 79
cluded, for example, manufacturers of asbestos,
80
tampons, DES (a form of synthetic estrogen used to prevent miscar83
2
riages), 8 Agent Orange,8 formaldehyde, and the Dalkon Shield.84

Additionally, the size of punitive damage awards dramatically increased to the point that it was not surprising to read of a Florida

jury awarding $3 million in an action concerning a defective automobile,85 or of a Colorado jury handing $6.2 million in punitive damages
88
Examples of enormous awards beto a plaintiff in an IUD case.

came common.8 7 This sudden change in the awarding of punitive
damages resulted in extensive scholarship devoted to products liabil-

ity litigation during the late 1970s and early 1980s.88 Currently, most
78. See, e.g., Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1982) (upholding $500,000 punitive award).
79. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(upholding $3.5 million punitive award in Pinto case).
80. See, e.g., O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1987)
(reinstating $10 million punitive verdict that trial court remitted to $1,350,000).
81. See, e.g., Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.E.2d 182 (N.Y. 1982) (upholding verdict in favor of plaintiff that pre-natal exposure to defendant's product caused cancer).
For more information on mass DES litigation, see Note, Market Share Liability: An
Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 HARv. L. REV. 668 (1981).
82.' See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y.
1980) (granting government's motion to dismiss in class action brought by Vietnam veterans and members of their families).
83. See, e.g., Hughes v. Segal Enter., 627 F. Supp. 1231 (W.D. Ark. 1986) (allowing
punitive damages in personal injury action involving formaldehyde gas).
84. See, e.g., In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig.,
526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1171 (1983) (granting certification of a class on motion by manufacturer of intrauterine device for all plaintiffs with pending punitive damage actions).
85. See Toyota Motor Co. v. Moll, 438 So. 2d 192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (affirming $3 million punitive award in an auto fuel design defect case).
86. See Palmer v. A. H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984) (affirming $6.2 million punitive award in an IUD case).
87. See, e.g., Texaco v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W. 2d. 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), cert.
dismissed, 485 U.S. 994 (1988) ($3 billion punitive damage award remitted to $1 billion); Central Telecommunications, Inc., v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir.
1986), cert denied, 480 U.S. 910 (1987) ($25 million punitive damage verdict); Tetuan v.
A. H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210 (Kan. 1987) ($7.5 million punitive damage award);
Downey Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 234 Cal. Rptr. 835 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1036 (1988) ($5 million punitive damage award). For further lists of large punitive damage awards, see Brief of Petitioner at app. A, Pacific
Mutual v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991) (No. 89-1279) (listing 89 jury verdicts in Alabama between 1985 and mid-1990 that returned punitive damage awards over $500,000,
including six over $10 million); Jeffries, supra note 65, at 145 n.23 (providing an extensive list of large punitive awards). See also Sales & Coles, supra note 11, at 1154
("[T]he amount of punitive damage awards awarded in recent years, as if feeding upon
itself, has escalated to astronomical figures that boggle the mind.").
88. See generally James D. Ghiardi & John J. Kircher, Punitive DamageRecovery
in Products Liability Cases, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 1 (1981) (stating that knowledge and
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courts allow punitive damages to be awarded in products liability
litigation.8 9
c.

Punitive damages and vicarious liability

The number of punitive damage awards grew as courts held more
employers liable through the doctrine of vicarious liability. However,
obtaining punitive damages from an employer for the wrongful acts
of employees was not always easily accomplished. Near the turn of
the century, the United States Supreme Court held that a corporation would be liable for punitive damages only if it expressly authorized or ratified the acts of its employees.90 Commentators of the day
agreed with this view. 9 ' They argued that it is wrong to punish the
innocent employer for acts that he did not authorize. 92 Moreover,
they purported that such punishment would not result in more care93

ful hiring practices.
Nevertheless, some jurisdictions expanded the doctrine of respondeat superior to hold employers responsible for punitive damages,
even if the employer does not expressly authorize the employee's
wrongful acts. 94 In these jurisdictions, the employer is responsible
fault on the part of the manufacturer are consistently present in products liability actions involving punitive damages); Mark P. Robinson, Jr. & Gerald H. B. Kane, Jr.,
Punitive Damages in ProductLiability Cases, 6 PEPP. L. REv. 139 (1979) (arguing that
punitive damages are appropriate and constitutional in products liability cases);
Timothy J. Phillips, Note, The Punitive Damage Class Action: A Solution to the Problem of Multiple Punishment, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 153 (argues that a class action is an
effective means of avoiding multiple punishment); Mark Donald Peters, Comment, Punitive Damages, The Common Question Class Action, and the Concept of Overkill, 13
PAC. L.J. 1273 (1982) (arguing that courts should consider various factors concerning
the purposes of punitive damages prior to certifying a class action that seeks punitives); Nadine E. Roddy, Note, Punitive Damages in Strict ProductsLiability Litigation, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 333 (1981) (stating that most courts find punitive
damages appropriate in products liability suits); Harvey R. Weingarden, Comment, Exemplary Damages in Products Liability Cases, 1980 DET. C.L. REV. 647 (stating that
courts should impose punitive damages in products liability cases only when the manufacturer knows of the defect or consciously ignores the possibility); Alan Schulkin,
Comment, Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1797
(1979) (discussing the dangers of mass liability and proposing a new system based on
considering awards already given when determining new awards).
89. See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABzLITY, 1 29.01(2) (2d ed.
1990).
90. See Lake Shore & Michigan So. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 115 (1893)
(holding that a railroad was not liable for punitive damages since it did not authorize
or ratify the actions of employee).
91. See THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES, § 380 at
740-41 (9th ed. 1912) (preferring the view that punitive damages be awarded only if the
corporation authorized or ratified the conduct, or if the corporation was negligent in
hiring the employee).
92. See Note, The Assessment of Punitive Damages Against an Entrepreneurfor
the Malicious Torts of His Employees, 70 YALE L.J. 1296 (1961).
93. Id. at 1305-06.
94. See SCHULETrER & REDDEN, supra note 26, at § 4.4(B)(2)(a).
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for punitive damages if the company could be held liable for other
damages, and if the employee committed the wrong within the scope
of employment.95 This expansion came about as courts saw a need to
encourage companies to monitor their employees, and to discourage
companies from ignoring certain wrongful acts of their employees
that would benefit the company. 96 Most jurisdictions apply this
97
broad rule, though it is often criticized.

Some jurisdictions rejected the broad scope of employment rule
and adopted a narrower rule advocated by the Second Restatement of
Torts and the Second Restatement of Agency.98 This view, like the
old rule, holds that the employer will be liable for punitive damages
if the employer authorized the employee's act or was negligent in
employing the person. 99 However, the Restatements specify that the
corporation may be liable for unauthorized acts of managers, or for
employee actions approved or ratified by the principal or a manager.OO Therefore, depending on the jurisdiction, employers are vicariously liable to different degrees for punitive damages awarded
against their employees. 101
95. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 788 (1988).
96. See Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in PersonalInjury Cases, 21 OHIO ST.
L.J. 216, 220 (1960) (stating that holding employers generally liable is proper where
the company benefits from and ignores the employee's wrong).
97. See, e.g., Randy S. Parlee, Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages: Suggested Changes in the Law Through Policy Analysis, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 27 (1984) (suggesting changes from the current system that would greatly limit the liability of
employers); Timothy R. Zinnecker, Comment, Corporate Vicarious Liabilityfor Punitive Damages, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REv. 317 (arguing that punitive damages be imposed only
if the employee's act occurred within the scope of his employment and if damages
would deter future tortious conduct).
98. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 217c (1958).
99. The Second Restatement of Torts states that punitive damages may be awarded
"if the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the manner of the act,
or the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was reckless in employing or retaining him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1979). The Second Restatement of Agency states that punitive damages may be awarded "if the principal
authorized the doing and the manner of the act, or the agent was unfit and the principal was reckless in employing him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217c (1958).
100. The Restatements hold the corporation liable if "the agent was employed in a
managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment, or the principal or
managerial agent of the principal ratified or approved the act." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217c (1958).
101. Some argue that punitive damages through vicarious liability should not be an
established part of the American legal system. See Ellis, 1989, supra note 52, at 980
(stating that "no cogent justification has emerged" for imposing punitive damages
through vicarious liability); Ingram, supra note 57, at 221 (arguing that if punitive
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d.

Punitive damages and insurance bad faith actions

Insurance bad faith actions are a fairly recent development, and
these actions have added to the number of punitive damage awards.
Two factors created the bad faith cause of action. First, in the 1950s,
courts began to recognize a separate tort for breach of contract in addition to the underlying contractual claim. 0 2 Second, courts began to
read an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into contracts.103 These factors combined to create the tort of bad faith.104
The bad faith cause of action arose primarily as a means to bring
sanctions against insurance companies who engage in improper practices, usually consisting of the refusal to pay the claims of their insureds.105 The rationales behind the bad faith action are: First, to
balance the disparity in power between the parties; second, to protect
the policyholder's reasonable expectations; and finally, to counter the
benefits that an insurer can gain by not paying claims.106 Increasingly over the last two decades, courts have been willing to impose
punitive damages against insurers in these types of cases.107 These
cases also resulted in very large punitive damage awards, as juries
tended to look unfavorably on large, institutional, profit-making
defendants.108

These developments brought the punitive damage issue to the forefront of not just the legal community, but of the general public as
damages can be justified at all, they certainly cannot be justified through vicarious
liability).
102. See Laurence P. Simpson, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract, 20 OHIo
ST. L.J. 284, 287 (1959) ("[A]n increasing number of cases have been decided approving
assessment of exemplary damages in contract actions.").
103. See RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) ("[E]very contract imposes on each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its
enforcement."); see also STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS: LIABILITY AND DAMAGES § 1:01 (1991) (explaining the covenant of good faith and fair dealing as "a fictional
promise that neither party to a contract would do anything to deprive the other party
of the benefits of the contract").
104. See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973). In Gruenberg, the
court examined the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the duty of an
insurer to make payments that are due, and concluded that "[t]hese are merely two
different aspects of the same duty." Id. at 1037. See generally Richard B. Graves III,
Bad-FaithDenial of Insurance Claims: Whose Faith, Whose Punishment? An Examination of Punitive Damages and Vicarious Liability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 395, 399 (1990)
(stating that Gruenberg "laid the theoretical and legal foundation for the explosion of
... bad-faith insurance litigation that followed").
105. See Ashley, supra note 103, at § 1:09. Ashley states that bad faith actions
"evolved as a means of imposing sanctions on insurers who frustrate the smooth functioning of the insurance mechanism." Id.
106. See Graves, supra note 104, at 399.
107. Id. at 395.
108. See Ellis, 1989, supra note 52, at 999. Professor Ellis states that because jurors
do not effectively represent a cross-section of the community, they are even more
likely to bear antagonism toward institutional defendants than the public at large. Id.
at 997.
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well. Tort reform groups arose, calling for the abolition or modification of the punitive damage system. 09 These groups engaged in public relations and lobbying for their cause, extending the debate
beyond academics and into the political arena.11 0 Legal commentators showed more interest in the debate and took sides as the issue
became more heated."n
The general sentiment of the scholars
seemed adverse to awarding punitive damages.112 While some commentators remained unconvinced,"13 as the years went on, the case
against punitive damages grew stronger." 14
e. Empirical studies of punitive damages
As the debate surrounding the value of punitive damages grew,
supporters and detractors alike looked for hard data to support their
claims. The punitive damages debate has generally limited empirical
data to two studies,"5 though recently the results of a third study
have been published."i6 The Rand study, published in 1987, studied
109. For a lengthy list of reform groups that arose in the 1980s, see Daniels & Martin study, supra note 30, at 11 n.43.
110. Id. at 10-11. Daniels and Martin see the tort reform movement not as natural
reaction by the general public to the situation, but as "an intense, well-organized, and
well-financed political campaign by interest groups seeking fundamental reforms in
the civil justice system benefiting themselves." Id. at 10. They go on to state that reformers characterize the system as being out of control to serve their own ends, with
the result being that "the punitive damages debate has become a matter of public relations, propaganda, and the mobilization of prejudice and fear, rather than a matter of
rational discourse." Id. at 13.
111. See Symposium. Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 687 (1989); Symposium"
Punitive Damages,56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1982).
112. See Ellis, 1989, supra note 52, at 975-76.
113. See, e.g., Harvey R. Levine, Demonstratingand Preserving The Deterrent Effect of Punitive Damages in InsuranceBad Faith Actions, 13 U.S.F. L. REV. 613 (1979)
(arguing that punitive damages have a desirable effect in that they deter unfair insurance claims practices); Steven H. Reisberg, Note, In Defense of Punitive Damages,55
N.Y.U. L. REV. 303 (1980) (arguing that punitive damages play an important role in the
law of torts).
114. Compare David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation,
74 MICH. L. REV. 1258 (1976) (arguing that punitive damages are an appropriate and
effective means of punishment and deterrence in products liability litigation) with
David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of
Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1982) (questioning the appropriateness of punitive damages in products liability cases due to abuses of the system).
115. M. Peterson, et al., Punitive Damages: EmpiricalFindings (RAND, The Institute for Civil Justice, 1987) [hereinafter Rand study]; STEVEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, EMPIRICAL PATTERNS IN PUNITIVE DAMAGE CASES: A DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENCE
RATEs AND AWARDS (American Bar Foundation Working Paper Series No. 8705, 1988)
[hereinafter ABF study].
116. Daniels & Martin study, supra note 30.
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punitive damage awards in Cook County, Illinois and San Francisco
County, California between 1960 and 1984.117 The 1988 American Bar
Foundation (ABF) study analyzed punitive damage awards in thirtyfour counties in ten states during the early 1980s.n 8 The Daniels &
Martin study in 1990 first looked at the punitive awards of fortyseven counties in eleven states from 1981-85, and then the awards in
two counties from 1970-88.119
Groups on both sides of the punitive damage debate have used the
data and results of the Rand study.120 The findings seem to show
that although punitive damage awards generally increased in size and
frequency, most punitive awards, unlike the awards that grabbed the
headlines, were small.121 The ABF study concluded that courts did
not routinely award punitive damages, and that large awards were
rare. 122 The Daniels & Martin study was in agreement with these
findings.123 However, opponents of punitive damages have argued
that although large awards are rare, punitive damages are still problematic because the system allows for arbitrary awards.124
B. Due Process and Punitive Damages
1.

Procedural v. Substantive Due Process

Due process issues have always arisen in the context of punitive
damages. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits state governments from depriving a person of "life,
liberty, or property without due process of law."125 The Fifth
Amendment proscribes essentially the same thing with respect to the
federal government. 126 The concept of due process encompassed in
both amendments has traditionally been difficult to define.127 The
117. Ellis, 1989, supra note 52, at 985.
118. Id
119. Daniels & Martin study, supra note 30, at 6.
120. For examples and an explanation of this contradiction, see id at 24 n.101, 26
n.122. Daniels and Martin are critical of either side basing findings on the Rand study,
claiming that a case study such as Rand "does not represent a legitimate sample and
cannot serve as the basis for statistical generalization." Id. at 27.
121. See Ellis, 1989, upra note 52, at 985-86.
122. ABF study, supra note 115, at 19.
123. Daniels & Martin study, upra note 30, at 43.
124. See Ellis, 1989, supra note 52, at 987-88. Professor Ellis writes, "[I]t is not the
increase in median or even average awards that has stimulated the concern of business
executives, public officials, and journalists, and the interest of scholars. Rather, it is
the volatility and variance of the awards." Id at 987.
125. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
126. See U.S. CONST. amend IV.
127. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981). The Court
stated that "[f]or all its consequence, 'due process' has never been, and perhaps can
never be, precisely defined. '[Unlike] some legal rules ...[it] is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.'" Id. (quoting
Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
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Supreme Court has stated that for procedures to comport with due
process, they must be consistent with "ordinary notions of fair play
and the settled rules of law,"128 they must comply with "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice,"' 2 9 and they must not offend "the community's sense of fair play and decency."1 30 The Court
has further stated that the concept of fundamental fairness must always be present, "a requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as
its importance is lofty."'131
Due Process issues are raised in the context of two distinct categories.132 Procedural due process guarantees that the state will not
take one's life, liberty or property interests without a fair procedure.133 Substantive due process is concerned with the constitutionality of a law or government action. 3 4 Specifically, it concerns the
way that legislative action may impair individual freedoms.i3
Thus,
in a substantive due process analysis, the Court determines whether
the substance of a rule falls within constitutional boundaries. 38 In a
procedural due process analysis, the Court examines if the process
used in applying a certain rule is fair.137
An award of punitive damages raises both procedural and substantive due process concerns. 138 The state may violate procedural due
process if the state procedure for awarding punitive damages is unfair
in that it gives juries unlimited discretion to award the damages.' 3 9
A substantive due process violation may occur when the court finds
the amount of a punitive damage award to be arbitrary and capricious.140 A procedural due process claim and a substantive due process claim may arise together, or they may arise independently of
each other. For example, an arbitrary jury award may violate substantive due process, though the jury followed an appropriate
procedure.
128. Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
129. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
130. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952).
131. Lassiter,452 U.S. at 24.
132. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTIrTrUONAL LAW, § 13.1 at 487
(4th ed. 1991).
133. Id. at § 10.6 at 338.
134. Id. at § 10.6 at 339.
135. Id at § 13.1 at 487.
136. Id at § 10.6 at 339.
137. Id.
138. Id, at § 10.6 at 338 n.1.
139. Id.
140. Id
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Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged the common law
system of awarding punitive damages throughout its history, it has
never ruled directly on the issue of the system being violative of procedural due process. 141 Likewise, no other court has held that the
common law system violates procedural due process, though courts
142
have ruled on various substantive due process issues.
2. Substantive Due Process Issues
In Wangen v. Ford Motor Co.,143 Ford was the defendant in two
lawsuits alleging strict liability in tort and negligence after a Pinto,
manufactured by Ford, exploded in an accident.144 Ford argued that
the court should view the mass production of a defective product as
one wrongful act. 145 Under this view, Ford maintained that allowing
many plaintiffs to recover would constitute multiple punishment and
therefore, violate due process.146 The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the argument, finding that the wrong Ford committed was not
in the manufacture, but in the injuries that Ford caused; hence, the
47
court could punish Ford for each injury.1
In Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,148 the defendant made a
similar argument. In Cathey, two separate plaintiffs brought products liability actions against a manufacturer of asbestos.149 The defendant, Johns-Manville, claimed that imposing multiple punitive
damage awards in a mass tort action would constitute multiple punishment for only one wrong.150 Such punishment, it argued, would
violate due process.151 The Sixth Circuit did not agree and held that
the opportunity to litigate the propriety of the punitive damage
52
awards gave Johns-Manville all the process it was due.1
Other defendants have argued that a single punitive damages
141. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983); Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri, 224 U.S.
270 (1912); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889); Barry v.
Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550 (1886); Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512 (1885);
Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
142. See, e.g., McCutchen v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 699 F. Supp. 701, 709 (N.D.
Ind. 1988) (stating that the court could find no cases where the punitive damage system was held to violate due process); FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., 691 F. Supp. 87, 100
(1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1524 (1990) ("TIhe court finds no constitutional infirmity as to the procedure for assessment of punitive damages.").
143. 294 N.W.2d 437 (Wis. 1980).
144. Id. at 440.
145. Id. at 454.
146. Id. at 466.
147. Id. ("The gravamen of Ford's alleged offense is not only the manufacture and
distribution of the car but the injury caused thereby.").
148. 776 F.2d 1565 (6th Cir. 1985).
149. Id at 1567-69.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1571.
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award may be so large as to deny due process. Texaco appealed a
Texas state court's approval of a $3-billion punitive damages award in
Texaco, Inc., v. Pennzoil Co.'53 In Texaco, Pennzoil alleged that Texaco knowingly and intentionally interfered in a pending contract between Pennzoil and Getty Oil in which Pennzoil was to buy almost
half of Getty's stock.154 The jury awarded a total of $11.12 billion in
damages, $7.53 billion being compensatory.155 Texaco sought and obtained a preliminary injunction that prohibited Pennzoil from enforcing the judgment. The Second Circuit determined that because of
the enormous size of the award, state statutory lien and bond provisions limited Texaco's right to appeal, thereby denying due process.'15 The case then went to the Texas court of appeal, which
57
allowed a punitive award, but found that $3 billion was excessive.
55
The court ordered the award remitted to $1 billion.
In Dahlbeck v. DICO Co., Inc., 159 an employee brought a product liability action against a truck manufacturer, seeking punitive damages
and claiming that a malfunction caused a crane on top of a truck to
strike power lines and injure the employee. 160 The defendant argued
that the simultaneous submission of the requests for a finding of liability and an award of punitive damages violated due process. While
recognizing this possibility, the appellate court refused to rule on the
issue as it was not raised at trial.16 1
The above decisions reflect the variety of substantive due process
challenges to punitive damage awards. As more of these cases were
brought, it became inevitable that some would reach the Supreme
Court, and also that a procedural due process challenge to the common law system would emerge.
3.

Supreme Court Decisions in the 1980s

On three occasions in the late 1980s, the Supreme Court decided
153. 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986).
154. Id. at 1136.
155. Id,
156. Id. at 1154. However, the Supreme Court soon removed the injunction and
ruled that the Court of Appeals should not have heard the case, because adequate state
remedies may have been available. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
157. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 866 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
158. Id The court stated that "[i]n this case, punitive damages of one billion dollars
are sufficient to satisfy any reason for their being awarded, whether it be punishment,
deterrence, or encouragement of the victim to bring legal action." Id,
159. 355 N.W.2d 157 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
160. Id. at 161.
161. Id.
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cases involving punitive damages that raised due process issues. 162 In
each case, for various reasons, the Court refused to rule directly on
the due process claims, and decided the cases on other grounds.
However, the Court expressed interest in each case as to the due process challenge, but postponed the opportunity to rule on the issue. A
brief look at these cases and the Court's comments is important to
establish a context for examining Pacific Mutual.
a. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie (1986)
The first case the Supreme Court decided was Aetna Life Ins. Co.
v. Lavoie.16 3 In Aetna, a policy holder filed suit against an insurance
company in state court after the company refused to pay the full
amount of a hospital bill.164 The plaintiff claimed bad faith on the
part of the company, and the jury returned an award of roughly $1.6
million in compensatory damages and $3.5 million in punitive damages. 16 5 The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the award in an opinion joined by Judge Embry. 6 6 Aetna appealed on various grounds.
It argued that the Alabama procedure for awarding punitive damages
lacked sufficient standards and therefore violated procedural due
process.167 Additionally, while the appeal was pending, the appellant
learned that Judge Embry had filed two suits, pending at the time
Aetna was decided, against insurance companies that alleged bad
faith refusal to pay claims and sought punitive damages.168 The appellant then filed motions that challenged Judge Embry's participation in the case on the grounds that substantive due process
mandates that only disinterested judges participate. 169
The Supreme Court held that Judge Embry's participation in the
case did, in fact, violate the appellant's due process rights.170 Because
the Court decided the case on these grounds, the Court did not rule
on the procedural due process issue concerning the method of assessing punitive damages. However, the opinion stated that the argument "raise[d] important issues which, in an appropriate setting,
162. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989);
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
163. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
164. Id, at 815-16.
165. Id. at 816.
166. Id, at 816-17.
167. Id, at 828.
168. Id. at 817.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 825. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court and was
joined by Justices Brennan, White, Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor. Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment, and was joined by Justice Marshall. Justice Stevens
did not take part in the decision of the case.
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must be resolved."171 Thus, the Court demonstrated an initial interest in a procedural due process challenge.
b. Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw (1988)
The Supreme Court next decided Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v.
Crenshaw.172 Bankers Life also involved a bad faith action against an
insurance company that refused to pay a claim. The petitioner generally argued that a $20,000 actual damage and $1.6-million punitive
damage award violated due process. 173 The Court did not decide the
due process issues, however, because the petitioner failed to raise
7
them.1 4
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice
Scalia, voiced concern about the procedural due process issue.175 She
wrote that the "[a]ppellant has touched upon a due process issue that
I think is worthy of the Court's attention in an appropriate case." 7 6
The opinion also expressed Justice O'Connor's belief that a party
might successfully challenge that punitive damages violate due process. She stated that "because of the punitive character of such
awards, there is reason to think that this may violate the Due Process Clause,' 77 and that the system which gives "wholly standardless
discretion to determine the severity of punishment appears inconsistent with due process."'1 78 The stronger language of Bankers Life
lent momentum to the idea that the Court might decide against the
common law punitive damage system.
c. Browning-Ferrisv. Kelco Disposal (1989)
In the year following Bankers Life, the Supreme Court decided
Browning-FerrisIndustries Inc. v. Kelco Disposal Inc.179 In Browning-Ferris,the defendants brought an action charging the plaintiffs
with antitrust violations and interference with contractual rela171. Id. at 828-29.
172. 486 U.S. 71L(1988).
173. Id. at 76. For further discussion of the case, see Forrest Campbell, Comment,
Bankers Life: Justice O'Connor's Solution to the Jury's Standardless Discretion to
Award Punitive Damages, 24 WAKE FOREsT L. REV. 719 (1989).
174. Bankers Life, 486 U.S. at 76-77.
175. Id. at 86-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 87 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
177. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
179. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
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tions.180 The appellants claimed that a $6 million punitive damage
award violated the excessive fines clause of the Eighth Amendment. 181 The action also raised a due process challenge under the
Fourteenth Amendment, questioning whether due process served to
check jury discretion when there is an absence of statutory limits on
punitive damage awards.182 This claim, based on the size of the
award, raised both substantive and procedural due process issues.
The Court acknowledged that there might be some precedent for
holding that a certain, exceedingly large punitive award might violate
substantive due process. 8 3 Further, the Court stated that it had
never addressed the issue of the lack of a statutory limit violating
procedural due process. 8 4
The Court noted that it had rarely invoked the Eighth Amendment
in civil actions, but that the lack of past action did not preclude their
doing so in this case.' 8 5 Nevertheless, the Court refused to hold that
the award violated the Eighth Amendment. It reasoned that the
Eighth Amendment applies only when the government takes action
against an individual, not in actions between private parties. 8 6 The
Court did not address the due process issues, as the petitioners failed
to raise them at either the trial or appellate level.187
Despite the Court's refusal to rule directly on either the substantive or procedural due process issues in Browning-Ferris,all of the
opinions touched on due process, thus keeping due process concerns
very much alive. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion stated that
"[t]here is some authority in our opinions for the view that the Due
Process Clause places outer limits on the size of a civil damages
award made pursuant to a statutory scheme."18 Justice Brennan,
joined by Justice Marshall, wrote in a concurring opinion that he
"join[ed] the Court's opinion on the understanding that it leaves the
door open for a holding that the Due Process Clause constrains the
imposition of punitive damages in civil cases brought by private par180. For more information and analysis concerning the decision, see Steven H.
Sneiderman, The Future of Punitive Damages After Browning-Ferris Industries v.
Kelco Disposal, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1031 (1990); Gary T. Schwartz, Browning-Ferris:The
Supreme Court's Emerging Majorities, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1237 (1989).
181. Browning-Ferris,492 U.S. at 261.
182. Id. at 277.
183. Id at 276.
184. Id. at 276-77.
185. Id. at 263-64. This application of a traditionally criminal protection to a civil
circumstance raised hope in some areas that the Court would likewise apply Fourteenth Amendment criminal protections to civil proceedings. See Nicholas K. Kile,
Note, ConstitutionalDefenses Against Punitive Damages: Down But Not Out, 65 IND.
L.J. 141, 149-50 (1989).
186. Browning-Ferris,492 U.S. at 275.
187. Id. at 277. The Court stated that the "inquiry [into the due process challenge]
must await another day." Id.
188. Id. at 276.
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ties." 18 9 Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred in
part and dissented in part. She stated that "nothing in the Court's
opinion forecloses a due process challenge to awards of punitive damages or the method by which they are imposed."'19
The wording in the above cases clearly demonstrated the Court's
interest in hearing a procedural due process challenge to punitive
damages. Some commentators believed all along that a procedural
due process attack could be successful,'91 and others came to see this

as true in light of the Court's triumvirate of recent decisions.192
Thus, the dicta in the previous cases paved the way for the resolution
of the punitive damages due process issue in Pacific Mutual v.

HaSlip.193

III.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Facts of the Case

In 1981, Lemmie Ruffin solicited life and health insurance coverage
for the employees of Roosevelt City, Alabama.194 Ruffin sold life insurance for Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company and health insurance for Union Fidelity Life Insurance Company.195 Although
Ruffin always represented himself as a Pacific Mutual agent, and not
as an agent for both companies, he made a single proposal to the city
for both coverages.196 Under this proposal, the city clerk made
monthly payments directly to Ruffin on behalf of the city employees.
Ruffin subsequently misappropriated most of the funds he re189. 1d. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring).
190. 1d. at 283 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, Justice O'Connor welcomed both the substantive (relating to the "awards of punitive damages") and procedural (relating to "the method by which they are imposed") due
process challenges. Id.
191. See Ellis, 1989, supra note 52, at 1007 ("The process of adjudicating punitive
damages claims falls far short of due process.").
192. See Sneiderman, supra note 13, at 1046 (concluding that in light of the recent
decisions, "the Court will be receptive to a due process argument regarding excessive
punitive damage awards"); Kile, supra note 185, at 165 (1989). Kile states that Browning-Ferrisdid not set back constitutional challenges to punitive damages. Id. "Instead,
the proper arrow [for a due process challenge] may be drawn from the constitutional
quiver for an attack that appears stronger than ever."). Id
193. 111 S. Ct. 1.032 (1991).
194. Id,at 1036.
195. Id.
196. See Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 553 So. 2d 537, 542 (Ala. 1989). The
Alabama Supreme Court decision lists examples where Ruffin acted solely as Pacific
Mutual's agent. Id
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ceived. 197 Union Fidelity notified Ruffin that the city employees'
health insurance had lapsed, but Ruffin failed to inform the city. 198
Cleopatra Haslip, a city employee, was hospitalized in early 1982
with a kidney infection.199 During her stay, she incurred physician
and hospital charges of approximately $4,000.200 Upon discharge,
Haslip discovered that she had no health insurance coverage, and the
hospital required her to pay her bill.201 Haslip did not have the

money, and the hospital turned over the collection of her accounts to
a collection agency, which damaged her credit. 202 Haslip, along with
three other city employees, brought suit against Pacific Mutual under
the doctrine of respondeat superior, and against Ruffin, claiming
20 3
damages for fraud.

B. ProceduralFacts
1. Trial Court
The court instructed the jury that they could award punitive damages if they found liability for fraud.204 Pacific Mutual did not object
197. PacifcMutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1036.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1037 n.2. In their brief, Haslip's attorneys stated that "the hospital bills
[were] equivalent to almost half her annual take home pay." Brief for Respondents at
1-2, Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991) (No. 89-1279) (emphasis in original).
201. PacificMutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1036.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1036-37.
204. Id. at 1037. The jury charge relating to punitive damages was as follows:
Now, if you find that fraud was perpetrated then in addition to compensatory damages you may in your discretion, when I use the word discretion, I
say you don't have to even find fraud, you wouldn't have to, but you may, the
law says you may award an amount of money known as punitive damages.
This amount of money is awarded to the plaintiff but it is not to compensate
the plaintiff for any injury. It is to punish the defendant. Punitive means to
punish or it is also called exemplary damages, which means to make an example. So, if you feel or not feel, but if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the plaintiff, whatever plaintiff you are talking about, has had a
fraud perpetrated upon them and as a direct result they were injured and in
addition to compensatory damages you may in your discretion award punitive
damages.
Now, the purpose of awarding punitive or exemplary damages is to allow
money recovery to the plaintiffs, it does to the plaintiff, by way of punishment
to the defendant and for the added purpose of protecting the public by deterring [sic] the defendant and others from doing such wrong in the future. Imposition of punitive damages is entirely discretionary with the jury, that
means you don't have to award it unless this jury feels that you should do so.
Should you award punitive damages, in fixing the amount, you must take
into consideration the character and the degree of the wrong as shown by the
evidence and necessity of preventing similar wrong.
Id at 1037 n.1.
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to the jury cbarge. 20 5 The jury found that Ruffin acted as Pacific
Mutual's agent when he committed his acts, and found that his acts
were indeed fraudulent.206 The jury returned a verdict of $1,040,000
in damages for Haslip, of which about $840,000 was punitive. 20 7 The
jury also awarded the other three plaintiffs between $10,000 and
$16,000.208 Pacific Mutual moved for a new trial. The trial court reviewed and approved the punitive damages award before denying the
motion. 2o9 Pacific Mutual appealed the decision to the Supreme
Court of Alabama.
2.

Supreme Court of Alabama

The Alabama Supreme Court, in a divided opinion, affirmed the
trial court's decision.2 10 Two Justices dissented in part, believing that
the award violated Pacific Mutual's procedural due process rights because the Alabama system did not offer the defendant enough protections. 21 However, the majority did not agree. The majority found
that the evidence supported the findings that Ruffin's fraud occurred
within the scope of his agency. 212 The majority also agreed with the
trial court's decision not to remit the punitive award. 213 Pacific Mutual, minus Ruffin, appealed the case again, and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if the process and
award violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 214
IV.

A.

ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION

Majority Opinion
In looking at the due process issues involved in the awarding of pu-

205. I at 1037.
206. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 553 So.2d 537, 541-42 (Ala. 1989).
Whether or not one is an agent of another is a question for the jury, and the jury reasonably believed that Ruffin was Pacific Mutual's agent. Id&
207. Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1037.
208. Id at 1037 n.2.
209. Pacific Mutual, 553 So. 2d at 543.
210. Id
211. Id. at 544-45 (Maddox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Maddox wrote that he could not believe that the Alabama common law system "is sufficient to accord to litigants all the due process protection the Constitution envisions."
Id. at 545 (Maddox, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
212. Id. at 541-43.
213. Id. at 543.
214. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1032, 1037-38 (1991).
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nitive damages to Cleopatra Haslip, a majority of the Court 215 held
that: (1) finding the insurance company responsible for the acts of its
agent does not violate substantive due process; 216 (2) the common law
method of assessing punitive damages is not per se unconstitutional;217 (3) the awarding of punitive damages might violate procedural due process in some instances;2 18 and (4) the award of punitive
damages in this case did not violate procedural due process because it
was based upon objective criteria and was subject to procedural protections. 219 The opinion began with the facts of the case22 0 and then
discussed the Court's recent decisions concerning punitive
damages. 22 '
1.

Substantive Due Process

The Court first dealt with Pacific Mutual's substantive due process
claim. 22 2 Pacific Mutual asserted that holding the company liable for

Ruffin's fraud on the basis of respondeat superior was fundamentally
unfair. 223 To decide the issue, the Court examined whether Ruffin
was acting within the scope of his employment when he defrauded
his clients.224 Pacific Mutual tried to establish that Ruffin was not
acting as its agent. 22 5 To demonstrate the separation between themselves and Ruffin, Pacific Mutual listed various examples, 226 including a claim that Ruffin was in fact working for another company.
Pacific Mutual also argued that the award was unfairly large because
the focus of the punitive damage award was on the company, and not
215. Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens. Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion, as did Justice Kennedy. Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion.
Justice Souter did not participate in the decision of the case. Id at 1036.
216. Id at 1041.
217. Id at 1043.
218. Id
219. Id at 1046.
220. Id at 1036-37. See supra notes 194-214 and accompanying text.
221. Id at 1038-40. See supra notes 162-93 and accompanying text.
222. Id at 1040-41.
223. Id at 1040. Pacific Mutual argued in its brief, "Due process requires that corporations not be punished on a respondeat superior basis where, as here, the acts of
the agent were not performed in the business of the corporation, with intent to benefit
the corporation." Brief of Petitioner at 10, Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S.
Ct. 1032 (1989) (No. 89-1279).
224. Paciflc Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1040-41.
225. Id
226. Pacific Mutual argued that neither it nor its "manager was aware that
Ruffin was collecting premiums contrary to his contract; that Pacific Mutual
had no notice of the actions complained of prior to ... this litigation; that it
did not authorize or ratify Ruffin's conduct; that his contract ... forbade his
collecting any premium other than the initial one ... ; and that Pacific Mutual
was held liable and punished for . . . acts performed on behalf of another
company."
Id at 1040.
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Ruffin, who was acting solely to benefit himself.2 v7 Pacific Mutual
argued that to hold it liable in light of these facts was fundamentally
228
unfair.
The Court refuted Pacific Mutual's argument by first stating that
the lower courts had found that Ruffin was acting within the scope of
his employment, and that they had no reason to dispute this finding.229 The Court also stated that Ruffin's claim of working for another insurance company had no merit since Pacific Mutual benefited
from the policies that Ruffin sold.230 The Court further explained

that Pacific Mutual knew about Ruffin's shady business practices
before this case arose.23 1 Pacific Mutual had received notice that
Ruffin had committed fraud of this type before, that his customers
had complained about lacking coverage, and that he received premium payments directly, a practice against company policy.232 The
Court concluded that Ruffin indeed acted as an agent of Pacific Mu233
tual when he committed the fraud.
Having established that Ruffin was Pacific Mutual's agent, the
Court next examined if holding Pacific Mutual liable for Ruffin's acts
on the theory of respondeat superior violated substantive due process.2 34 The Court noted that the traditional rule in Alabama holds a

corporation responsible for compensatory and punitive judgments
against its agents in actions for fraud.235 The Court used the "rational basis" test 2 36 and determined that the rule "rationally advance[s] the State's interest in minimizing fraud."237 This being the
case, the Court held that finding Pacific Mutual liable for Ruffin's
fraud did not violate Pacific Mutual's substantive due process
227. Id
228. Id
229. Id, The Court found that the record sufficiently supports the finding. Id
230. Id. at 1041. The Court found that Ruffin was working for Pacific Mutual because "[t]he details of Ruffin's representation admit of no other conclusion." Id See
supra note 196 and accompanying text.
231. Id at 1041.
232. Id
233. Id
234. Id.
235. Id
236. The rational basis test appears in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483,
487-88 (1955). Under the rational basis test, the Court will assume that the legislature
had a rational reason for enacting a certain law, and if it can find no explicitly stated
reasons, it will hypothesize until it can come up with a conceivable one. See NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 132, at § 11.4 at 375.
237. Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1041.
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rights.

2 38

Pacific Mutual also argued that the jury instructions violated substantive due process because they were vague. 239 The Court barely
acknowledged this argument, dismissing it in a five-sentence footnote
at the end of the opinion. 240 Pacific Mutual argued that similar to
the Court finding a statute that allowed juries discretion to award
costs against an aquitted defendant to be unconstitutionally vague, so
should it find Alabama's jury instructions to be unconstitutionally
vague. 241 The Court distinguished the situations by noting that
"[d]ecisions about the appropriate consequences of violating a law are
significantly different from decisions as to whether a violation has
2
occurred." 42
2.

Constitutionality of the Common Law Method

The Court began an examination of the procedural due process
challenge to the common law method by citing instances throughout
history where the Court had approved of the procedure. 243 It stated
that in light of its continued recognition of the practice, and the fact
that no other court, state or federal, had ever held that the practice
violated procedural due process, the Court could not hold the practice to be per se unconstitutional. 244 The Court noted that the practice existed prior to the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and no evidence exists that the drafters of the Amendment desired a
change in the system.2 45
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1046 n.12. The void for vagueness doctrine applies to criminal laws, and it
states that laws must give sufficient notice to citizens as to what activities are criminal
so that people will know if they are acting illegally. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 132 at § 16.9 at 950. Regarding the issue that the vagueness doctrine applied only
to criminal laws, Pacific Mutual argued that "[p]unitive damages are punishment, and
therefore the standard of scrutiny for vagueness should be similar to that in criminal
cases." Brief for Petitioner at 9, Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032
(1991) (No. 89-1279). Courts may strike laws that violate due process as being void for
vagueness when persons "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926). This occurs when a law is "so indefinite that the line between innocent and
condemned conduct becomes a matted of guesswork." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-31 at 1033 (2d ed. 1988).
240. Paciftc Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1046 n.12. However, Justice O'Connor thought
the argument worthy of consideration and devoted a substantial portion of her dissent
to it. See infra notes 309-36 and accompanying text.
241. Id See Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966) (finding statute granting
juries discretion to award costs to acquitted defendants to be vague).
242. Pac(fic Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1046 n.12.
243. Id at 1041-43.
244. Id at 1043. The Court quoted, "'If a thing has been practised [sic] for two hundred years by common consent, it will need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect it.'" Id. (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730 (1988)).
245. Id at 1043. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 111 (1934) ("The Fourteenth Amendment has not displaced the procedure of the ages.").
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3.

Common Law Method May Violate Procedural Due Process in
Extreme Cases

The Court stated that though the common law method did not violate procedural due process, it would be error to say that an award of
punitive damages could never be unconstitutional.2 40 This might occur, for example, in a system where a jury is left entirely to its own
discretion and reaches an outrageous punitive verdict that "jar[s]
one's constitutional sensibilities."2 47 However, the Court refused to
adopt a rigid standard for determining when an award may be unconstitutional. 248 Rather, the Court stated that "general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the court when the case is
tried to a jury properly enter into the constitutional calculus."249

4.

Procedural Due Process Not Violated in This Case

Having stated that common law method may violate procedural
due process in some instances, the Court next examined if the Alabama system was within constitutional bounds.250 To do this, the
Court examined three specific factors: the jury charge, the trial
court's review, and the Alabama Supreme Court's review.2 5 '
The jury charge described the purposes of punitive damages but
made no mention of the wealth of the defendant.252 While recognizing that the instructions provided the jury with broad discretion to
award punitive damages, the Court found that the instructions sufficiently limited that discretion, as they related to the legitimate state
interests of punishment and deterrence.2 5 3 The Court believed that
246. Pacij'w Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1043. The Court quoted William v. Illinois, 399
U.S. 235, 239 (1970) ("[N]either the antiquity of a practice nor the fact of steadfast legislative and judicial adherence to it through the centuries insulates it from constitutional attack.").
247. Pacifi Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1043.
248. Id. The majority stated that "[w]e need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a
mathematical bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case." Id In fact, the reasonableness standard
is far from a bright. line standard.
249. Id,
250. I.
251. Id. at 1044-45. For a discussion of the rationales of punishment and deterrence,
see supra notes 46-64 and accompanying text.
252. Id, Several phrases in the jury instructions explained that the purpose of punitive damages are "not to compensate the plaintiff for any injury" but "to punish the
defendant" and protect "the public by [deterring] the defendant and others from doing
such wrong in the future." Id. at 1044. For the complete jury instructions, see supra
note 204.
253. Id at 1044.
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the instructions "reasonably accommodated Pacific Mutual's interest
in rational decision-making and Alabama's interest in meaningful individualized assessment of appropriate deterrence and retribution."254 Also, other accepted areas of the law allowed similar
discretion. 255 Thus, the Court found the discretion reasonably limited, and not violative of due process. 2 m
The Court then turned its attention to Alabama's post-trial review
procedures for trial courts in cases where the jury awards punitive
damages. 257 The procedures consisted of an examination of the
award in light of factors enunciated in Hammond v. City of Gadsden.25 8 The Hammond court examined factors such as the culpability of the defendant's conduct, the desirability of discouraging others
from future conduct, the impact upon the parties, and other factors
including the impact on innocent third parties.259 The Court found
that the Hammond procedure provided a "meaningful and adequate
2
review." 60
The Court then examined the Alabama Supreme Court's review of
the decision. 261 The regular procedure of the Court, followed in this
case, begins with a comparative analysis of other awards given in similar cases, 2 6 2 and then reviews the award based on seven criteria set
out in Green il Co. v. Hornsby.263 These criteria extend and elaborate on the Hammond factors. The Green Oil factors are:
(1) whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive
award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as
well as the harm that has actually occurred; (2) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the duration of that conduct,
the defendant's awareness, any concealment, and the existence and
frequency of past conduct; (3) the profitability to the defendant from
the wrongful conduct and the desirability of removing that profit and
254. Id.
255. Id. Examples that the Court cited were "the best interests of the child," "reasonable care," "due diligence," and "appropriate compensation for pain and suffering
or mental anguish." Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala. 1986). In Hammond, the widow of a city employee, covered by her husband's insurance policy, sued the city for misrepresentation after a
change in the city's coverage left her without insurance. Id. at 1374-76.
259. Id. at 1379.
260. Pacflc Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1044.
261. Id. The Court noted that "the Alabama Supreme Court provides an additional
check on the jury's or trial court's discretion." Id.
262. The Alabama Supreme Court engaged in this type of comparative analysis in
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 505 So. 2d 1050, 1053 (1987), rev'd, 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
See supra notes 163-71 and accompanying text (discussing both decisions).
263. 539 So.2d 218 (Ala. 1989). Green Oil involved a claim by gas station owners
that alleged fraud on the part of Green Oil, the company from which they bought
gasoline.

1424

[Vol. 19: 1397, 1992]

Pac(fc Mutual v. Haslip
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

of having the defendant sustain a loss; (4) the "financial position" of
the defendant; (5) all the costs of the litigation; (6) the mitigating factor of the court's imposition of criminal sanctions on the defendant;
and (7) the mitigating factor of the existence of other civil awards
against the defendant for the same conduct.2 6 4
The Court determined that these standards imposed "a sufficiently
definite and meaningful constraint on the discretion of Alabama fact
finders in awarding punitive damages." 265 To demonstrate this, the
Court cited instances where juries applied the factors, 266 and where
the Alabama Supreme Court's application in post-verdict review resulted in the lowering of punitive damage awards.2 67 The Court also
stated that the standards were as specific as some adopted in other
jurisdictions.2 "
Thus, the Court concluded that Pacific Mutual had benefited from
all of the procedural safeguards available. 26 9 While recognizing the
great size of the award,2 70 the Court found that the award did not
reach a level of unconstitutionality, and therefore, rejected the due
process challenge. 271
B. Justice Scalia's ConcurringOpinion
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, but vented some strong
criticism of the majority opinion. His concurrence began by berating
264. Id. at 223-24.
265. PaciflcMutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1045.
266. Id. The Court cited Green Oil, 539 So. 2d at 219 and Williams v. Ralph Collins
Ford-Chrysler, Inc., 551 So. 2d 964, 966 (Ala. 1989) (applying Hammond factors in a
case for fraud involving a buyer and a car dealership).
267. Id. at 1045. The Court cited Wilson v. Dukona Corp., 547 So. 2d 70, 74 (Ala.
1989) (allowing compensatory but not punitive damages in the case of an adjoining
landowner wrongfully cutting timber), and United Servs. Auto. Ass'n. v. Wade, 544 So.
2d 906, 917 (Ala. 1989) (stating that a punitive award in an insurance bad-faith action of
$3,500,000 was excessive).
268. Pac(Ac Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1046. Specifically, the Court cited statutes in Ohio
and Montana. Id. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(B) (Anderson Supp. 1989) and
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1989). Id.
269. Pac(fc Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1046.
270. Id. The Court acknowledged that the punitive damage award was "more than
four times the amount of compensatory damages, [was] more than 200 times the out-of.
pocket expense of respondent Haslip ... [and was] much in excess of the fine that
could be imposed for insurance fraud." Id.
271. Id. The punitive damage award in this case did not "cross the line into the
area of constitutional impropriety." Id. This would be an example not of applying a
"mathematical bright line," but of fixing a line as determined by the factors in an individual case.

1425

the majority for not actually resolving the due process issue.2 72 He
stated his belief that the traditional practice of awarding punitive
damages in itself satisfies procedural due process, and as such, questions of "fairness" and "reasonableness" are irrelevant.7 3
Justice Scalia examined the history of punitive damages, and noted
that, as did the rest of the Court, they "were firmly rooted in our history." 274 For Justice Scalia, this fact was enough for him to conclude
that the imposition of punitive damages could never violate due process. 275 To him, our legal system determines a practice's conformity
with procedural due process, not the Court, and no precedent com7 6
pels the Court to undertake this task.
Justice Scalia then undertook a lengthy examination of the history
and nature of "due process." 277 He elaborated on the historical approach to due process that the Court had adopted in the early twentieth century, 278 and noted that the concept of fundamental fairness
had effectively replaced the historical approach.21 9 The Court used
the fundamental fairness rationale to find unconstitutional two tradi80
tional practices in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View 2
and Shaffer v. Heitner.28l Justice Scalia believes the the Court im272. Id. at 1046-47 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia wrote, "This jury-like verdict provides no guidance as to whether any other procedures are sufficiently 'reasonable,' and thus perpetuates the uncertainty that our grant of certiorari in this case was
intended to resolve." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
273. Id. at 1047 (Scalia, J., concurring).
274. Id. at 1048 (Scalia, J., concurring).
275. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia noted that both the majority and the
dissent recognize the lengthy history of acceptance of punitive damages, but both decisions "reject the proposition that this is dispositive for due process purposes... I disagree." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia has used a similar historical analysis
to justify that substantive due process (as opposed to procedural in this case) was not
violated. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-27 (1989) (holding that not recognizing a father's interest in raising his daughter does not violate a father's substantive due process rights because the daughter was born to a woman married to another
man, and such relationships are not traditionally protected).
276. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
277. Id. at 1048-53 (Scalia, J., concurring). Although Justice Scalia never actually
stated so, he is obviously speaking of procedural due process.
278. Tenets of the historical approach rested on principles espoused in such cases
such as Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), and Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97 (1934), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). As Justice Scalia explained, "Hurtado,then, clarified the proper role of history in a due process analysis: if
the government chooses to follow a historically approved procedure, it necessarily provides due process, but if it chooses to depart from historical practice, it does not necessarily deny due process." Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1050 (Scalia, J., concurring)
(emphasis in original). Justice Cardozo wrote in Snyder that a state may "regulate the
procedure of its courts in accordance with its own conception of policy and fairness unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105.
279. Pac fc Mutual, 111 S.Ct. at 1051-53 (Scalia, J., concurring).
280. 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (holding that garnishing wages by creditor without notice
or hearing is unconstitutional).
281. 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (holding general quasi in rem jurisdiction unconstitutional).
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properly decided these cases. 28 2 This placed Scalia in a predicament;
if he followed precedent, he could not agree with the majority because he did not believe that the practices in Pacific Mutual were
fundamentally fair. 283 However, if he did not follow the cases, he
would be ignoring stare decisis.
Justice Scalia resolved the problem by claiming that he need not
follow the precedents of the two cases, as the Court has not.2 s 4
Moreover, Scalia determined that the cases were inconsistent with
opinions that the Court never overruled.28 5 Therefore, he could follow the historical approach, and "affirm that no procedure firmly
rooted in the practices of our people can be so 'fundamentally unfair'
as to deny due process of law."288
Justice Scalia then stated that although the common law method of
assessing punitive damages is "harsh or unwise," this does not mean
that it is unconstitutional. 28 7 If in fact the system is harsh and unwise, then it is the states' responsibility to remedy it.2s s Justice
Scalia concluded that if the states someday abandon the common law
method, then perhaps the Court may hold that the method is not
consistent with procedural due process, but it would be improper to
do so when the method is still quite alive. 28 9
C. Justice Kennedy's Concurring Opinion
In his brief concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, like Justice
Scalia, put forth the principle that a legal tradition does not survive a
282. Pactfw Mutual, 111 S.Ct at 1053 (Scalia, J., concurring).
283. 1d (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia stated that "I can conceive of no test
relating to 'fairness' in the abstract that would approve this procedure, unless it is
whether something even more unfair could be imagined." I& (Scalia, J., concurring).
284. Id (Scalia, J., concurring).
285. Id (Scalia, J., concurring). Because of this, Justice Scalia stated, "I think it
[the rationale of Sniadach and Shaffer] has no valid stare decisis claim upon me." Id
(Scalia, J., concurring).
286. Id (Scalia, J., concurring). This quotation paraphrased the words of Justice
Cardozo in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934). This idea is directly opposed to
the principles Justice O'Connor set forth in her dissent. See infra note 365 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia clarified his principle by explaining that not "every practice sanctioned by history is constitutional." Id at 1054 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia's principle applies to the Due Process Clause, but would not affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the Equal Protection Clause. Id (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
287. Id (Scalia, J., concurring).
288. Id (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia stated: "It is through those meansState by State, and, at the federal level, by Congress-that the legal procedures affecting our citizens are improved." Id (Scalia, J., concurring).
289. Id (Scalia, J., concurring).
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long period of time if it rests on "either irrational or unfair" principles.290 However, Justice Kennedy did not take the principle to the

extreme that Justice Scalia did. Rather, Justice Kennedy stated that
a long historical pedigree does not always preclude the possibility
that the practice might violate due process.29 1 In this particular case,
however, Justice Kennedy concluded that the common law method
did not violate due process becasue it "has such a long and principled
recognition as a central part of our system that no further evidence
of its essential fairness or rationality ought to be deemed
necessary." 292
Justice Kennedy then briefly examined the tradition of jury trials,
and their inherent inconsistencies. 293 He stated that jury trials by
their nature produce varying results, but this certainly does not mean
that the system is unconstitutional. 294 Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority that a specific award may indeed violate the Constitution.295 However, he disagreed with the majority in
the manner a particular award may be unconstitutional.
A court may find a specific punitive award, according to Justice
Kennedy, unconstitutional when bias or prejudice is shown on the
part of the jury.296 A huge punitive damage award, where little actual damage exists, "can be some evidence of bias or prejudice in an
appropriate case." 297 Such an award violates substantive, not procedural, due process. Justice Kennedy appreciated the difficulty in
proving a case on this basis, but felt it offered a more workable approach than that put forth by the majority.29 s As such, Justice Kennedy seemed to be arguing that substantive due process will protect
those who fall victim to the faults of the punitive damage system. He
criticized the majority for validating the common law method while
290. Id (Kennedy, J., concurring).
291. 1d at 1054-55 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy could not agree with
Justice Scalia's idea "that widespread adherence to a historical practice always forecloses further inquiry when a party challenges an ancient institution or procedure as
violative as due process." Id (Kennedy, J., concurring). However, Justice Scalia also
wrote that the principle "does not say that every practice sanctioned by history is constitutional." Id at 1054 (Scalia, J., concurring).
292. 1& at 1055 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
293. Id (Kennedy, J., concurring). According to Justice Kennedy, the inconsistencies are present in juries for two reasons. First, juries act in one isolated situation, not
over time. Second, the non-specific nature of jury instructions leads to unpredictability. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
294. rd (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy stated that "nonuniformity
cannot be equated with constitutional infirmity." Id (Kennedy, J., concurring).
295. Id (Kennedy, J., concurring).
296. Id (Kennedy, J., concurring).
297. Id (Kennedy, J., concurring).
298. Id (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy stated that his approach "rests
on sounder jurisprudential foundations than does the approach espoused by the majority." Id (Kennedy, J., concurring). However, he cited no authority for this conclusion.
Id (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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still examining the specifics of this case.2 9 He further expressed displeasure at the majority's failure to provide for future cases."
Justice Kennedy concluded by asserting that if the common law
system is flawed, state judges and legislatures are the appropriate
means for effecting change, not the Supreme Court. 30 1 He expressed
that the state courts and legislatures have the authority to change
common law procedures that have become unworkable, while it is
the role of the Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution.30 2 This
being the case, Justice Kennedy did not believe that the imposition of
3
punitive damages violated the Constitution in Pacific Mutual.30
D.

Justice O'Connor'sDissent

Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion focused immediately on the
problems with the common law system for awarding damages. She
stated that the awards are "inconsistent" and "unpredictable" and
that they are imposed "indiscriminately," with "a devastating potential for harm."3 o4 She stated that the Constitution requires courts to
provide juries with some standards to guide them, and since the Alabama court failed to do so, accepting such a system will have a negative effect on punitive damage reform.30 5 Justice O'Connor
enunciated two arguments explaining why the Court should have decided the case differently. Firstly, the jury instructions were void for
vagueness;3 06 and secondly, the Alabama procedure, like that of most
states, violates procedural due process when analyzed using factors
30 7
presented in Mathews v. Eldridge.
299. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
300. Id (Kennedy, J., concurring). The majority's approval of the method coupled
with further examination results in a "tension in its analysis ... [that] must be resolved in some later case." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
301. Id. at 1055-56 (Kennedy, J., concurring). This is in accord with some of Justice
Scalia's comments. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
302. Id at 1056 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Scalia's assertion that if the
states remove the process from our legal system, the Court then might declare that
due process has been violated, seems to be an extension of Justice Kennedy's thought.
See supra note 288-89 and accompanying text.
303. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
304. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 1056-57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
306. Id at 1056 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See supra notes 239-43 and accompanying text.
307. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Mathews dealt with the issue of whether due process requires an evidentiary hearing before terminating social security benefit payments. Id,
The Court held that it did not. Id
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1. The Void for Vagueness Question
Justice O'Connor set the groundwork for her vagueness argument
by stating that due process requires that states provide "meaningful
standards to guide in the application of [their] laws."30 8 If a law does
not provide such standards, then it is void for vagueness.30 9 Justice
O'Connor found that Alabama's punitive damages procedures fall
into this "void for vagueness" category.31 0 She examined in detail the
two decisions that the Alabama system requires juries to make:
whether or not to impose punitive damages, and if so, in what
amount.311
a. The decision to impose punitive damages
The Alabama court instructed the jury that the imposition of punitive damages was within the jury's discretion and that they did not
have to impose them if they felt it was improper.3 12 Justice
O'Connor argued that this is unacceptably vague, and offers no guidance whatsoever for the jury.313 She drew an analogy to Giaccio v.
Pennsylvania,3 14 where a statute afforded juries their discretion to
determine if an amount of money should be assessed against a defendant.315 In Giaccio, the Court struck down the statute as being
void for vagueness. 316 Justice O'Connor believed the Court should do
likewise here. 317 She stated that this case presents an even stronger
argument for unconstitutionality, as the statute fixed the amount
that the jury could award in Giaccio, while here the jury had absolute discretion. 318
Justice O'Connor strengthened her vagueness argument by stating
308. Id at 1057 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,
358 (1983) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974) (stating "'the principle
element of the [void for vagueness] doctrine (is] the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines' ")).
309. PacificMutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1057 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor
stated that this test applies not only to laws concerning conduct, but also to laws concerning jury instructions. For this principle, she relied on United States v. Batchelder,
442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979) (stating that criminal statutes may violate due process if they
do not specifically set out penalties).
310. PacificMutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1057 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
311. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
312. See supra note 204 for the entire jury charge.
313. Pac~icMutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1057 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor
felt that the instruction "invites individual jurors to rely on emotion, bias, and personal predilections of every sort." Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
314. 382 U.S. 399 (1966). Giaccio involved an 1860 Pennsylvania statute that authorized juries, at their discretion, to assess costs against defendants, even if they were
aquitted.
315. PacificMutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1057 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
316. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
317. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
318. Id. at 1058 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated, "If anything,
this is an easier case than Giaccio." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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that it did not matter that a jury instruction was at issue, as opposed
to Giaccio, where a statute was involved. 319 She also argued that the
vagueness standard does not apply exclusively to criminal penalties,
and thus the Court may invoke it in this case. 320 Thus, Justice
O'Connor concluded that the practice of leaving the decision regarding the imposition of punitive damages to juries, without any distinguishable standards to guide them, is void for vagueness. 321
b. Fixing the amount of damages
Justice O'Connor then turned to the jury instruction regarding the
amount of punitive damages to be awarded, if any. The charge told
the jury that they "must take into consideration the character and
the degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence and [the] necessity
of preventing similar wrong."32 2 She argued that this instruction
provides no guidance to the jury; it merely refers obliquely to the rationales of punishment and deterrence without providing a context
for them. 323 Justice O'Connor stated that due process requires the
courts to guide juries in some discernable way regarding the determination of the amount of punitive damages to be awarded.32 4
Justice O'Connor wrote that the specific jury instructions in Giaccio made the statute less vague, but did not raise it to a level consistent with due process. 32 5 Similarly, she argued that the jury
instructions in the present case did not raise the process to a constitutional level.3 2 6 Moreover, she stated that the opposite might have
happened, as the phrasing of the instructions might have led the jury
327
away from a rational decision.
To illustrate the irrationality of juries in responding to similar jury
319. Id, (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
320. Id, (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
321. Id at 1058-.59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
322. Id at 1037 n.1. See supra note 204 for the entire jury charge.
323. Id at 1059 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated that the Court
should have suggested some relation between the award to be given and the harm
caused, or suggested some way of measuring what the deterrent effect the award
would be. Id, (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
324. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She wrote, "Due process may not require a detailed roadmap [of how to determine a punitive award], but it certainly requires directions of some sort." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
325. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
326. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
327. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor paraphrased the instructions
as saying, "Think about how much you hate what the defendants did and teach them a
lesson." Id (O'Cornor, J., dissenting). A jury charge of this sort has little chance of
producing "a fair, dispassionate verdict." Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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instructions, Justice O'Connor provided two examples. First, she
cited Burlington N. R. Co. v. Wjitt,328 in which an administrator of a
decedent's estate sought $3 million in punitive damages, and received
a $15-million award from the jury.3 29 Second, she cited an Alabama
Supreme Court decision that documented vastly different punitive
33
Jusawards in two cases with similar facts and jury instructions.
3 31
She extice O'Connor stated that these results are avoidable.
plained that the Alabama Supreme Court has set out seven factors
for determining punitive damage awards in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby.332 These seven factors could be used to assist juries in making
rational decisions; unfortunately, they are not given to juries. As the
majority discussed, 33 3 reviewing courts, not juries, use the "Green Oil
Factors" to determine the propriety of the awards. 334 Unfortunately,
applying the factors after the fact does nothing to remedy Justice
O'Connor's concern with vague jury instructions.=
Based on these arguments, Justice O'Connor concluded that the
Alabama system for awarding punitive damages is void for vagueness.3 3 It fails to provide necessary guidelines to juries in determining if punitive damages should be awarded, and if so, in what
amounts.
2.

The Procedural Due Process Question

Justice O'Connor argued that Alabama's method of awarding punitive damages also violates procedural due process. 337 She stated that,
contrary to Justice Scalia's opinion, procedural due process changed
328. 575 So.2d 1011 (Ala. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1415 (1991).
329. PacificMutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1060 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). According to Justice O'Connor, the jury awarded $15 million despite the fact that the decedent "pulled
onto the tracks right in front of the train, thereby ignoring a stop sign, three warning
signs, and five speed bumps." Id. at 1060 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). However, the
court remitted the verdict to $5 million. Whitt, 575 So. 2d at 1024.
330. Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1060 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The second case
Justice O'Connor referred to is Charter Hosp. of Mobile, Inc. v. Weinberg, 558 So.2d
909 (Ala. 1990). In Charter Hospital, a doctor brought a conversion action against a
hospital for his interest in an abuse-treatment program. See also Washington Nat'l Ins.
Co. v. Strickland, 491 So.2d 872 (Ala. 1985) (returning a punitive verdict of $21,000,
over 15 times the compensatory damages, against an insurance company); Land & Assocs., Inc. v. Simmons, 562 So.2d 140 (Ala. 1989) (returning a punitive verdict of
$2,490,000, 249 times the compensatory damages, against an insurance company, which
was later remitted to $600,000).
331. Paci~fc Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1061 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
332. Id, at 1061 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Green Oil v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d
218 (Ala. 1989)). See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
333. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
334. Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1061 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
335. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
336. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
337. Ld.(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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with the times.338 In reaching this conclusion, she relied on the
three-factor test annunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge.339 The factors

are: First, the private interest at stake; second, the risk that existing
procedures will wrongly impair this private interest, and the likelihood that additional procedural safeguards can effect a cure; and finally, the governmental interest in avoiding these additional
procedures. 340
a, The private interest at stake
In examining the private interest at stake, Justice O'Connor stated
that private entities are often subjected to punitive damage awards.
Juries award amounts that have potentially devastating consequences
for defendants, and the lack of real standards makes this potential all
the more likely.341 She stated further that the quasi-criminal nature
of punitive damage awards stigmatizes the defendant in a far more
serious way than does a compensatory award.3 42 Accordingly, Justice
O'Connor concluded that "[t]he private property interest at stake is
34 3
enormous."
b.

The effect of the existing procedures on the private interest
and the likelihood that additionalprocedures will
effect a cure

The second factor in the Mathews test requires the Court to initially examine the existing procedures to determine if they are fair
and reliable, and, if not, to look at the feasibility of implementing a
procedure that will be fair.344

i. The fairness and reliability of existing procedures
Justice O'Connor stated the Court has frequently examined the
fairness and reliability of the common law punitive damage system
338. 1i (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
339. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See supra note 307 and accompanying text. See
Sneiderman, supra note 13, at 1042-45 (undertakes a Mathews analysis of traditional
punitive damage systems and concludes that more due process protections are required). But cf. Brief for Respondents at 35, n.57, Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991) (No. 89-1279) (arguing that a Mathews analysis might not be
proper, and if it is, it requires a finding that due process was not violated).
340. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
341. Paciftc Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1062 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
342. 1I (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
343. 1Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
344. 1i, at 1062, 1064 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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and has criticized it as being unfair and unreliable. 345 Justice
O'Connor agreed with the criticisms and argued that remedies to the
situation, such as post-trial review, are inadequate.3 46 Justice
O'Connor criticized post-trial review for giving too much deference to
those who award punitive damages. 347 She argued that the result is
not a review at all, but a mere formality followed in all but the most
egregious cases.s 4s
ii.The effect of new procedures
Justice O'Connor then examined the effect of new procedures. She
stated that the courts and legislatures could quite easily remedy the
problems with the existing system. 349 In Alabama, courts could implement the "Green Oil Factors" to provide much more guidance for
the juries. 35 0 She suggested other remedies including state legislatures implementing caps on punitive damages, according to specific
types of conduct.35 1 Also, Justice O'Connor mentioned the bifurcation of trials into separate proceedings dealing first with liability, and
then with punitive damages.352 Justice O'Connor finally suggested
that juries apply a clear and convincing evidentiary standard, as this
would limit imposition of punitive damage awards to the most severe
353
cases and emphasize the seriousness of the award to the juror.
Justice O'Connor stated that courts or legislatures could easily implement any of these modifications, and thus would provide more meaningful standards for the jury.3 54
c.

The governmental interest in avoiding the new procedures

Justice O'Connor then focused on the last Mathews factor, the gov345. Id. at 1062-63 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor provided examples
of this, the most prominent being in Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S.
257 (1989) and Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988). See supra
notes 172-90 and accompanying text.
346. Id. at 1063 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
347. Id. at 1063-64 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
348. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated that "[b]lind adherence
to the product of recognized procedural infirmity is not judicial review as I understand
it. It is an empty exercise in rationalization that creates only the appearance of evenhanded justice." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
349. Id. at 1064 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
350. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
351. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor justified imposing caps by
stating that as long as "the legislatively determined ranges are sufficiently narrow,
they could function as meaningful constraints on jury discretion while at the same
time permitting juries to render individualized verdicts." Id (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
352. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
353. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
354. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor would leave the decision to
the states as to which method they would adopt. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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ernmental interest in avoiding the new procedures. She examined
whether the states have an interest in preserving the existing method
of punitive damage awards.3 m Justice O'Connor concluded that the
states do not have such an interest.3 -m Justice O'Connor found meritless the argument that the existing system works to deter wrongful
conduct. 357 She argued that while juries must have some discretion
in awarding damages, allowing for totally arbitrary awards violates
due process. 358 Moreover, Justice O'Connor argued that the remedies
she suggested would still adequately serve the state's interest in punishing wrongful conduct.3 59 She stated further that these remedies
would better serve due process since the punishment would more appropriately suit the conduct.3 60 Therefore, she opined, the states
should have no objection to a system that serves their legitimate ends
while being more fair and rational.3 6 '
3.

Justice O'Connor's Response To Justice Scalia's Concurrence

Justice O'Connor disagreed with Justice Scalia's historical due process analysis. 36 2 She argued that due process is not static but flexible,
and though there is "a strong presumption of continued validity" in
established practices, this is a presumption, not an edict.3 For sup4
port, Justice O'Connor relied on Williams v. Illinois,W
where the
Court invalidated a traditional practice, reasoning that not even "ad355. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
356. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor relied on Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) which stated that "the States have no substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs ... gratuitous awards of money damages far in excess of
actual injury." I& at 349.
357. PacificMutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1064 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor
argued in support of the deterrence rationale that a system of predictable punitive
damage awards will not deter wrongdoing, as companies will factor that cost into their
business. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
358. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). As Justice O'Connor put it, %"theDue Process
Clause does not permit a state to classify arbitrariness as a virtue." Id (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
359. Id at 1065 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
360. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
361. Id (O'Conor, J., dissenting).
362. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor wrote that Justice Scalia "argues that a practice with a long historical pedigree is immune to reexamination." Id
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). This is very similar to Justice Kennedy's statement. However, Justice Scalia seemed not to make that broad of an assertion. See supra note 286
and accompanying text.
363. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Mathews set forth the concept that due process
is "flexible" and varies with "time, place and circumstances." Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
364. 399 U.S. 235 (1970). Williams dealt with an Illinois statute that allowed the
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herence to [the practice] through the centuries insulates it from constitutional attack . . *.."365Justice O'Connor argued that many
changes have occurred in the recent past that merit reevaluation of
the punitive damage system, and that procedural due process requires as much. 3 6
4.

Justice O'Connor's Conclusion

After Justice O'Connor explained her reasoning and addressed
Justice Scalia's opinion, she made her final points. Justice O'Connor
quoted the Court's statement that "'[t]he touchstone of due process
is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.' "367 She argued that the common law system promotes arbitrary results, going as far as to call it "the antithesis of due
process." 36 8 To Justice O'Connor, the common law system of awarding punitive damages violates procedural due process despite its history and the fact that glaring abuse might not have been present in
this case.36 9
Justice O'Connor declared that if she were to decide the case, she
would have required Alabama, and all states, to adopt some judicial
or legislative method of limiting jury discretion. 370 She stated that
the Court should not impose a particular method on all the states. 371
Rather, the Court should let the states decide themselves which rec372
ommendations to implement.
V.

IMPACT

Consumer groups immediately hailed the Pacjic Mutual decision,
while business and insurance interests denounced it.373 However, the
decision will have a long-term impact not only these groups, but on
many others as well.
state to keep indigent prisoners confined beyond the maximum sentence if the prisoner could not pay fines levied at sentencing. Id. at 236.
365. Id. at 239 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
366. Pactfic Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1066-67 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
367. Id. at 1067 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
331 (1986)).
368. Id. at 1067 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
369. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
370. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
371. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
372. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor speculated that the Court did
not side with her view out of fear of having to rule on the constitutionality of each
state's system. However, she did not see this happening, but instead believed that the
states would work it out on their own. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
373. Compare Denise Kalette, Consumers Hail Court Ruling, USA TODAY, Mar. 5,
1991, at B7 ("[Clonsumer groups hailed [the decision] as a victory.") with Andrea
Sachs, A Blow to Big Business; The Supreme Court Upholds a Punitive $1 Million Jury
Verdict, TIME, Mar. 18, 1991, at 71 ("[B]usiness groups found [the decision] crushing.").
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A.

Effect on Business

Big business in America, as represented by the eighty business and
professional organizations that filed twenty-four amicus briefs on Pacific Mutual's behalf, were disappointed with the decision. The
Court's holding sent a clear message that courts will find employers
liable for the acts of their agents. The task now for business interests
is to protect themselves from such judgments, and to apply pressure
on lawmakers to pass legislation to protect them.
1.

Increase of Internal Scrutiny

The best way for companies to protect themselves from a punitive
judgment is by increasing internal scrutiny. Justice Blackmun wrote
that "[i]mposing exemplary damages on the corporation when its
agent commits intentional fraud creates a strong incentive for vigilance by those in a position 'to guard substantially against the evil to
be prevented.' "374 Courts will hold corporations responsible for the
actions of their employees, and thus, it is imperative for a company to
ensure that their employees comply with the law. If the employees
do so, this greatly reduces the risk of litigation and a large punitive
damage award. 375 If the employees do not, then it is important that
the employer have proof that they attempted to ensure compliance
with the law.
Businesses most often use a corporate code of conduct as proof of
attempted compliance. These are becoming increasingly popular, as
3 76
studies have shown that most corporations have adopted one.
Courts may use the existence of a code in determining a corporation's
liability.3 77 A code of conduct that is individually suited to the company, and carefully implemented and enforced, should greatly protect against an award of punitive damages.3 78 It might also prevent
374. Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1041 (quoting Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v.
Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 116 (1927)).
375. See generally Ronald M. Green & Richard J. Reibstein, Negligent Hiring,
Fraud,Defamation and Other Emerging Areas of Employer Liability, BNA REP. 99107 (1988) (listing nine ways that employers may reduce their risk of being sued).
376. See ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER, ETHICS PouCIES AND PROGRAMS IN AMERICAN
BUSINESS 6 (1990) (stating that 85% of 711 corporations surveyed have adopted some
form of a code of conduct).
377. See RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF AGENCY § 230 cmt. c (1957) (stating that a code
of conduct "may be a factor in determining whether or not, in an otherwise doubtful
case, the act of the employee is incidental to the employment").
378. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and
Criminal Liability:.A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559
(1990). The authors outline a procedure for companies to use in promulgating a code
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the types of wrongs on the part of employees that lead to litigation.379 If the corporation has evidence that they have tried to guide
their employees in acting properly, then the rationale of using punitive damages to deter corporate misconduct is unconvincing.3 80 Damages exceeding compensatory damages would be inappropriate,
because the company diligently attempted to ensure lawful action on
the part of employees.381 To punish a company when it acted properly would not encourage other companies to do likewise.
2.

Increase of Pressure on Local Lawmakers

After Pacific Mutual, the efforts of business interests will shift to
where Justice Scalia suggested they should be: with the states. 38 2
Some groups that advocated reform of the system relaxed their efforts because they believed the Court's decision in Pacifc Mutual
would go in their favor.38 3 It is clear that these groups will increase
the pressure on state legislatures to enact various remedies encom38
passing their perception of the punitive damages problem. 4
3.

Other Effects on Business

a. Aviation law
Recent authorities see Pacific Mutual as "[t]he most important
case in aviation law, in decades." 38 5 Punitive damages are particularly important in aviation law.386 Courts award punitive damages
generally when a plaintiff shows that a defendant knew the impropriety of his actions, and proceeded regardless. 38 7 In all aviation matof conduct. This procedure consists of: (1) selecting a team to draft the code; (2) tailoring the code to the culture of the company; (3) taking inventory of the companies
needs; (4) crafting the corporate code; (5) adopting the corporate code; and (6) administrating the code. Id. at 1637-45.
379. Id. at 1635.
380. Id. at 1650. A corporation should offer evidence including documents signed
by the offending employee stating that he understands and agrees to comply with the
code of conduct, and some sort of documentation that the corporation previously disciplined an offending employee for similar acts. Id. at 1649-51.
381. Id. at 1651. The authors state that adopting a code of conduct demonstrates a
strong intent to operate within the law. Id at 1634.
382. See Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1054 (Scalia, J., concurring).
383. See Diane Dimond, Think it Over and Get Back to Us: Supreme Court Ruling
on Punitive Damage Awards, INS. INFORMATION INST., 52 INS. REv. 32 (1991) (quoting
Martin Connor, president of the American Tort Reform Association, "The Haslip case
moves punitive damages back to the top of the agenda. We didn't push it while everyone thought the Supreme Court might solve the problem. But now it's clear the Court
won't legislate for us.").
384. See Stephen Wermiel, Justices Don't Limit Punitive Damages, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 5, 1991, at A2.
385. See Lee S. Kreindler, Clearance for Punitive Damages, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 29,
1991, at 3.
386. Id.
387. Id.
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ters, manufacturers know that problems can occur at great speeds
and altitude, and thus plaintiffs commonly allege recklessness and
seek punitive damages.3 88 Airline manufacturers and aviation attorneys had hoped that the Court would somehow limit punitive awards,
but this did not happen.
Pacific Mutual could also hamper international efforts to ban punitive damages in airline disasters.38 9 Some suggest that since the
Court affirmed the validity of punitive damages, the United States
may not take part in Montr6al Protocol 3, an international treaty
that would ban recovery of punitive damages in aircraft disasters.39 0
b.

Punitive damages in arbitration

Business arbitrators have increasingly awarded punitive damages
in cases before them.3 91 As arbitration increases as an alternative to
litigation, courts tend to uphold decisions of arbiters, including those
that award punitive damages. 3 92 However, authorities are split on
39 3
It is
the propriety of awarding punitive damages in arbitration.
unclear as to how Pacific Mutual will affect the debate. If the Court
had ruled in favor of Pacific Mutual, though, it seems that the decision would have limited or eliminated the practice of awarding punitives in arbitration.
B. Effect on FutureDue Process Challenges
Although the Court upheld the constitutionality of the common
law system for awarding punitive damages, the language of the deci388. Id. As the author wrote, "[W]hat may be ordinary negligence in the manufacture of a product to be used on the ground, may be wanton recklessness in contemplation of a failure in the air." Id.
389. See Ruling May Kill Punitives Awards Ban, CRAIN Bus. INS., Apr. 8, 1991, at
27.

390. Id.
391. See Michael Siconolfi, Blow to Brokers: Stock Investors Win More Punitive
Awards in Arbitration Cases, WALL ST. J., June 11, 1990, at Al (reporting that arbitration panels have awarded 21 punitive damage awards totaling $4.5 million since May of
1989).
392. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Sys., Inc., 882 F.2d 6, 8-9 (1st
Cir. 1989) (stating that there is no reason to prohibit arbiters from awarding punitive
damages if they could have been obtained in court); Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1387 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating that issues arising as to the scope of
arbitration, including punitive damages, are to be resolved on the side of arbitration).
393. Compare Earbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (upholding arbiter's punitive damage award) with Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman,
935 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir. 1990) (vacating arbiter's punitive damage award).
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sion left the door open for future due process attacks along several

lines.
1.

Post Trial Review Procedures

The majority decision focused on the existence of the post trial review procedures in Alabama to conclude that punitive damage
awards did not violate procedural due process.3 4 This suggests that
the lack of a post-trial review, or a review less comprehensive than
Alabama's, may violate procedural due process. States apply various
standards, and approximately half the states have criteria as strict as
Alabama's. 395 Punitive damage awards in other states that do not
have such standards may be vulnerable to attack.39 6 Attorneys and
legislators in each state should review the constitutionality of their
state's standards in light of Pacifi Mutual.
2. Focus on the Wrong, not the Wrongdoer
The Court considered the fact that Alabama's procedures focus on
the wrong committed, and not on the wealth of the wrongdoer.3 97 A
party could mount a due process challenge in a particular case if the
wealth of the defendant was disclosed and ultimately considered by a
jury.

3.

398

Focus on the Size of the Award

The Court stated that since the punitive damages award was two
hundred times respondent's out-of-pocket expense, it came close, but
did not "cross the line into the area of constitutional impropriety." 399
The relation of the punitive damage award to the compensatory
394. Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1044-45.
395. See Dimond, supra note 383. Victor Schwartz, a product liability expert with
the Washington, D.C. firm of Crowell & Moring made the estimate.
396. Pacifw Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1045 n.10. The decision distinguished the punitive
damage schemes in Vermont and Mississippi, in which awards are set aside when they
are "manifestly and grossly excessive" or "shock the conscience." Id. (quoting Pezzano v. Bonneau, 329 A.2d 659, 661 (Vt. 1974) and Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So.2d 254, 278 (Miss. 1985)). The implication seems to be that these schemes
would not be constitutional. California likewise adopts a standard that presumes a punitive damages award is correct. A court will not overturn this standard unless it is so
excessive as to be attributed to prejudice.
397. Id, at 1045. "Alabama plaintiffs do not enjoy a windfall because they have the
good fortune to have a defendant with a deep pocket." Id
398. But see Adams v. Murakami, 813 P.2d 1348 (Cal. 1991). This recent California
case seems to misinterpret Pacifc Mutual. Although the Adams court acknowledged
that an examination of the defendant's worth is proper at a post-trial review, the court
went on to say that Pacific Mutual encouraged the trial court to consider the impact
upon the parties. The California Supreme Court concluded, "Obviously, this factor
would encompass consideration of the defendant's financial condition." Id, at 1355.
399. Paciftc Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1046.
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award was roughly four to one. 400 It seems clear that a defendant
could raise a valid due process claim when the ratio of punitive damages to either compensatory damages or out-of-pocket expenses exceeds that of Pacifi Mutual.
C. Remedies to be Proposed to the States
Justice O'Connor, in her dissent, stated that there were several solutions to the current problems with the punitive damage system.4 01
Specifically, state legislatures might place caps on punitive damages,
courts could bifurcate trials into proceedings that deal first with liability and then punitive damages, and courts could require juries to
apply a higher evidentiary standard in determining punitive damages. 402 Because reform of the punitive damage system will now fall
squarely on the states, states will seriously consider these suggestions. The following sections analyze the viability and effectiveness
of the various methods.
1.

Caps on Punitive Damages

One can usually justify statutory caps on punitive damage awards
on the grounds that the tremendous uncertainty associated with punitive awards is unfair to defendants40 and that a huge, unforeseen
award can lead to the destruction of companies. 404 However, legislatures must examine any consideration of statutory caps in light of the
potential to undermine the deterrent function of punitive damages. 405 If a company has a reasonable estimate of the damages they
might incur, they will consider this when deciding whether or not to
proceed with questionable actions that might result in liability.40 6
Currently, nine states have adopted some form of a statutory cap
400. The court awarded the plaintiff $200,000 in compensatory damages and
$840,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 1037 n.2.
401. See supra notes 351-56 and accompanying text.
402. Id.
403. See Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How
Much?, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (1989) ("Unpredictable damages are neither fair nor
efficient."); David G. Owen, Deterrence and Desert in Tort: A Comment, 73 CAL. L.
REV. 665, 672 (1984) (favoring caps because "the risk of excessive awards should be reduced by establishing certain limits").
404. See Amelia J. Toy, Comment, Statutory Punitive Damage Caps and the Profit
Motive: An Economic Perspective, 40 EMORY L.J. 303, 323 (1991).
405. See Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigmof Efficiency in
Tort Law, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1385, 1406 (1987) ("[O]ptimal deterrence is not inconsistent with unlimited and variable awards.").
406. See Ellis, 1989, supra note 52, at 981.
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on punitive damage awards. 407 These caps fall into three basic categories: the absolute dollar cap, the fixed ratio cap, and the profit ex408
traction cap.
a.

The absolute dollar cap

An absolute dollar cap creates a maximum limit that a punitive
damage award may not exceed. 4° 9 States have imposed this type of
cap in two ways. The first way is to create a ceiling for all punitive
damage awards. If the jury goes beyond this limit, the court will reduce the judgment to meet the set amount. 410 The second way imposes a general limit, but creates an exception for particularly
egregious cases.41 ' Caps of this type seem to undermine the deterrent purposes of punitive damages, as companies can factor potential
losses into the cost of doing business. If the company considers the
amount insignificant, then the punitive damage award is not a
punishment.

b. The fixed ratio cap
The fixed ratio cap sets a limit on punitive damage awards according to some ratio to the compensatory damages. 412 The ratio ranges
from an amount equal to compensatory damages, to four times the
amount, though some exceptions also apply.413 The fixed ratio cap is
much more flexible than the absolute dollar cap, yet it still might not
effectively deter wrongful conduct on the part of business. The con407. The states are: Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Nevada,
Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia.
408. See Toy, supra note 404, at 331-35. Toy sets forth the names of these categories, and gives an extensive discussion of each. Md
409. I& at 331.
410. Virginia has adopted this form of cap, and has set the limit at $350,000. Id
411. Alabama and Georgia have adopted this type of system, and both have set the
amount at $250,000. 1& at 331-32. Alabama invokes the exception for cases involving a
pattern of wrongful behavior, malice or fraud, libel, slander or defamation. rL at 332.
Georgia does not impose a limit for cases that involve some specific intent to harm. Id
412. 1L at 332-34. Five states have adopted some form of the fixed ratio cap: Colorado, Florida, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Texas. AL
413. Colorado allows an amount equal to the actual damages, though the court can
increase this to three times the amount if it finds the defendant willingly repeated his
conduct or aggravated the plaintiff's injuries. Il at 332-33. Florida's ratio is three
times the actual damages, though courts may award more if clear and convincing evidence of extreme circumstances warrants. I at 334. Nevada applies a hybrid of the
absolute dollar cap and the fixed ratio cap. Nevada limits punitive damage awards to
three times the actual damages if the actual damages are $100,000 or more; if actual
damages are less, then punitive damages may not exceed $300,000. AL at 333. Nevada
makes exceptions to these limits for actions involving toxic torts, defamation, or products liability. L Oklahoma allows punitive damages equal to actual damages, but if
the court finds certain outrageous conduct before submitting the case to the jury, no
limits apply. Id. at 333-34. Texas caps punitive damages at $200,000 or four times the
actual damages, whichever is greater. Id. at 333. However, the limit does not apply to
intentional torts, or cases involving malice. Id
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duct of the company at fault does not determine the amount of an
award; rather, the harm that a plaintiff suffered is determinative. 14
This encourages companies to guard against wrongs that may result
in large injuries, while factoring in or ignoring wrongs that may re415
sult in small ones.
c.

The profit extraction cap

The profit extraction cap is a unique type of limit which is applied
in Kansas. 416 The punitive award limit is placed at the lesser of $5
million or the defendant's highest gross annual income in the preceding five years. 417 However, if the court determines that the defendant expected to profit in excess of the maximum punitive damage
award, the court may award punitive damages equal to one and onehalf times the defendant's expected profit.4 18 A court can use this
system to effectively deter and punish a company for its wrongs because the system tailors the limit to the individual company in a
419
meaningful way.
Statutory caps are but one way that states may attempt to modify
their punitive damage systems. As shown, caps can effectively remove the unpredictability from punitive awards, but states must be
careful not to subvert the deterrent purpose of punitive damages.
2.

Bifurcated Trials

Justice O'Connor suggested that courts bifurcate trials into a liability phase and a separate phase to determine the amount of punitive
damages. She based this idea on arguments made by a well-known
commentator in the punitive damages field.420 The rationale behind
this idea is that punitive damages are often sought in cases whose
complexity makes it difficult for juries to correctly and fairly assess
the awards. 42 1 Some states, recognizing this problem, have created
414. Id. at 336-37.
415. Id.
416. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(c) (1989).
417. Id. at § 60-3701(e).
418. Id. at § 60-3701(f).
419. See Toy, supra note 404, at 335. Toy states that "[t]his outer limit on punitive
damages, based on a multiple of expected profit, deters the potential defendant completely ....
Id.
420. See Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1064 (1991)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (referring to Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due
Process,and the Jury, 40 ALA. L. REV. 975, 995-96 (1989).
421. For a discussion of this complexity and the problems for juries, see Ellis, 1989,
supra note 52, at 999-1003. But see Alan Howard Scheiner, JudicialAssessment of Pu-
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statutes that require judges to assess punitive damages in cases where
the jury has already determined liability.422
In most jurisdictions, courts can bifurcate trials involving punitive
damages by statute or at their discretion. 423 However, this pertains
only to the amount of punitive damages.42 4 The liability for punitive

damages is assessed at the same time as the compensatory liability.425
Unfortunately, this process does not alleviate the complex problems
that juries encounter in distinguishing the different standards and
purposes of compensatory and punitive damages.426 Courts should

first have a trial dealing strictly with liability for compensatory damages, and then hold another proceeding dealing with liability and the
amount of punitive damages.42 7 This will allow juries to concentrate
on one complex set of issues, standards, and amounts instead of two,

thereby obtaining fairer results.428
3.

Higher Standard of Proof

Some have suggested applying the higher standard of clear and
convincing evidence to the determination of punitive damages.429

The rationale is that the purpose of punitive damages is to punish
and deter, not merely to compensate. 430 This being the case, punitive
damages are more like criminal than civil penalties, and a higher
standard is justified. 431 Some states have already adopted this higher

standard.432
The clear and convincing standard serves two goals. First, it limits
jury discretion by allowing punitive damage awards in only the most
serious cases. 43 3 Second, it emphasizes the importance and distinct
nature of punitive damages to the jury, and ensures that juries deternitive Damages, The Seventh Amendmen and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM.
L. REv. 142, 144 (1991) ("[Claims of jury incompetence and bias fall flat in the realm
of punitive damages.").
422. Connecticut, Kansas and Ohio have done this. See Scheiner, supra note 421, at
142. Scheiner states that judges and juries generally agree on whether or not to impose punitive damages, but they significantly disagree on the amount to be awarded.
Id. at 166.
423. See Ellis, 1989, supra note 52, at 1002-03.
424. Id
425. Id at 1003.
426. Id at 1002.
427. Id. at 1003.
428. Id
429. See Ellis, 1989, supra note 52, at 991-99; Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and
Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damagesin ProductsLiability Litigation,74 KY. L.J.
93-94 (1985); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive
Damages Procedures,69 VA. L. REv. 269, 311-14 (1983).
430. See supra notes 46-64 and accompanying text.
431. See Ellis, 1989, supra note 52, at 993.
432. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
433. See Ellis, 1989, supra note 52, at 995.
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mine liability more carefully.434 Imposing the higher standard of
proof is a quick and easy way for states to move toward limiting jury
discretion.
The impact of Pacific Mutual will be felt by all the following:
Businesses, future due process challenges, and remedies considered
by the states. The Court's seven-one decision combined with the
Court's youth seems to indicate that the impact of the decision will
be felt for many years to come.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Court decided Pacifw Mutual in a way that surprised many in
the legal as well as business fields. Some have attributed the decision
to a poor showing by Pacific Mutual's counsel during the oral arguments. 43 5 Whatever the case, the Court did not accept the due process argument that it had hinted it might. However, the Court's
decision did not explicitly reject all other due process arguments. By
wording the decision as broadly as it did, the Court left open the possibility of future cases coming before it on similar issues. What these
issues are and when this will come about is uncertain. Pacifwc Mutual made it clear that until that time, any attempts at punitive damage reform will have to come from the states.
CHRISTOPHER V. CARLYLE

434. See Wheeler, supra note 429, at 297-98.
435. See Tony Mauro, Damaging the Anti-Punitive Crusade, LEGAL TIMES Oct. 8,
1990, at 10. Mauro characterized the performance by Bruce Beckman, counsel for Pacific Mutual, as a "debacle" and "painful," noting that "Beckman stumbled from the
start [and used a] tentative style--strained and full of long pauses." Id.
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